Confiding in Con Men:
U.S. Privacy Law, the GDPR, and Information Fiduciaries
Lindsey Barrett*
“We have a responsibility to protect your data, and if we
can’t then we don’t deserve to serve you.”

Mark Zuckerberg, CEO of Facebook1
Zuck: yea so if you ever need info about anyone at Harvard
Zuck: just ask
Zuck: i have over 4000 emails, pictures, addresses, sns
Friend: what!? how’d you manage that one?
Zuck: people just submitted it
Zuck: i don’t know why
Zuck: they “trust me”
Zuck: dumb fucks

Id.2
ABSTRACT
In scope, ambition, and animating philosophy, U.S. privacy law and
Europe’s General Data Protection Regulation are almost diametric
opposites. The GDPR’s ambitious individual rights, significant
prohibitions, substantive enforcement regime, and broad applicability
contrast vividly with a scattershot U.S. regime that generally prioritizes
facilitating commerce over protecting individuals, and which has created
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1. Mark Zuckerberg, FACEBOOK (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/zuck/posts/10104
712037900071 [https://perma.cc/WD94-ZRH8].
2. Jose Antonio Vargas, The Face of Facebook: Mark Zuckerberg Opens Up, NEW YORKER
(Sep. 20, 2010), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/09/20/the-face-of-facebook [https://per
ma.cc/R9ML-2XBZ].
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perverse incentives for industry through anemic enforcement of the few
meaningful limitations that do exist. A privacy law that characterizes data
collectors as information fiduciaries could coalesce with the commercial
focus of U.S. law, while emulating the GDPR’s laudable normative
objectives and fortifying U.S. consumer privacy law with a moral valence
it often lacks. Similar to classic fiduciaries like doctors or lawyers,
information fiduciaries would owe duties of loyalty, care, and
confidentiality to their clients—affirmative commitments to individuals
that the laissez-faire approach of U.S. privacy law generally does not
require. Fiduciary duties are also derived from the context of commercial
relationships, where the law balances the professional prerogatives of the
fiduciary with the rights (and vulnerabilities) of the client. Crucially, an
information fiduciary model can strengthen protections for privacy,
equality, and autonomy in the digital age, echoing the GDPR’s normative
objectives, while balancing those principles with the competing aims (and
constraints) of the U.S. legal ecosystem.
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INTRODUCTION
There is no longer any question that data collection can create
privacy harms for individuals: the question is what the law can and should
do about it. As various legal systems continue to produce a variety of
answers, harmonizing the full gamut of approaches to privacy regulation
in a globalized system is no small feat.
In the United States, consumer privacy law is shaped around a
conception of privacy as a good, and is heavily motivated by the desire to
foster an innovative climate for U.S. companies.3 Data collection by
private entities is governed by a patchwork of state and federal law that
applies on a sectoral basis. If no sector-specific law applies—or the
appropriate law excludes certain types of actors within the field, which is
often the case4—the data collector is free to collect and use what it will,
subject to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) unfairness and deception
enforcement authority.5 The central goal of U.S. privacy law is to create
an environment where industry experiments first and asks questions later,
while privacy law that in any way hinders that ability is often criticized as
paternalistic or retrogressive—or worse, European.6
3. Paul Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115,
132 (2017) (describing the “marketplace discourse” of privacy in the United States); see, e.g., Roslyn
Layton & Julian McLendon, The GDPR: What It Really Does and How the U.S. Can Chart a Better
Course, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 234, 235–36 (2018) (describing the “serious and negative
unintended consequences” of the GDPR and arguing that “[t]he American notion of privacy is
predicated in large part on freedom from government intrusion and as a counterweight to the growth
of the administrative state”); Maureen Olhausen, Acting Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at
FTC Informational Injury Workshop 4 (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/1289343/mko_speech_-_info_injury_workshop_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/75JZ4VP9] (“But if there are no harms, then data use restrictions impose only costs and no benefits.”).
4. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5 (2012); 45 C.F.R. § 160 (2018).
5. This is true if the FTC has jurisdiction over the data collector, which is not always the case.
The FTC does not have jurisdiction over common carriers, non-profits or other consumer areas where
Congress has given oversight to another agency, such as the Federal Aviation Administration.
6. See Charlemagne: Waiting for Goodot, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.economist.
com/europe/2018/10/13/europes-history-explains-why-it-will-never-produce-a-google?frsc=dg%7Ce
[https://perma.cc/JC2W-RTP2] (“Asked whether the continent will ever produce its own Google, one
burst out laughing.”); see, e.g., GDPR & CCPA: Opt-ins, Consumer Control, and the Impact on
Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 116th Cong. 13 (2019)
(statement of Rosalyn Layton, Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise Institute), https://www.judiciary.
senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Layton%20Testimony.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXX2-ALJM] (arguing, nine
months after its implementation, that the GDPR has stymied innovation and the United States should
“leapfrog” that regime with a more flexible approach); ALAN MCQUINN & DANIEL CASTRO, INFO.
TECH. INNOVATION FOUND., WHY STRONGER PRIVACY REGULATIONS DO NOT SPUR INCREASED
INTERNET USE 2–3 (2018), http://www2.itif.org/2018-trust-privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/6AB6BRXN] (“Aggressive regulatory policies, such as those deployed in GDPR, will likely do little to
nothing to increase trust, but will limit digital innovation and raise costs, thereby reducing use relative
to more balanced rules. It is time, therefore, to end the spurious claims that more privacy regulation is
pro-innovation and pro-consumer.”).
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In Europe, the conceptual and regulatory balance is reversed. As both
privacy and data protection are considered fundamental human rights,
legal protections for such rights are fulsome and tend to prioritize the
protection of individual rights over ease of compliance for companies.7
The EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) reflects these
normative commitments in aspects like the range of individual rights it
creates, the breadth of its definitions and jurisdiction, the affirmative
requirements and prohibitions it creates for industry, and the enforcement
regime that ensures those objectives are actually met. The law has been
globally influential, due to both the breadth of its applicability and the
other laws it has inspired.8 The ultimate impact of the GDPR’s reach
remains to be seen as regulators start to apply it and business practices start
to shift, but U.S. state and federal lawmakers have already begun asking
whether “GDPR-style” protections in the United States are possible,
advisable, or even inevitable.9
As enthusiasm for new privacy regulation in the United States
climbs, another approach to privacy regulation has been steadily gaining
popularity: the idea of applying fiduciary duties like care, loyalty, and
confidentiality to entities that collect digital information.10 The idea of the
information fiduciary, proposed by law professor Jack Balkin, takes an
established legal relationship arising out of certain circumstances of trust,
sensitive information exchange, and reliance, and applies it to the context
of companies that collect, process, and store enormous amounts of digital
information about individuals. Classic fiduciary relationships include
doctors and patients, lawyers and their clients, or investment advisors and
their clients.11 These relationships are marked by the client trusting the
fiduciary with sensitive information such that the fiduciary can provide a
service that requires specialized skills or knowledge, and which the client
cannot generally perform for herself. The resulting difficulty of
supervision creates an incentive for the fiduciary to abuse the client’s trust.
7. See, e.g., William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 965–
66 (contrasting the U.S. and EU approaches, as well as detailing the difference between data protection
and privacy law); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3 (contrasting the U.S. and EU approaches).
8. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 122 (calling the GDPR “stunningly influential” on privacy
law around the globe).
9. Mark R. Warner, Potential Policy Proposals for Regulation of Social Media and Technology
Firms 15–16 (draft white paper), https://graphics.axios.com/pdf/PlatformPolicyPaper.pdf [https://
perma.cc/C9BR-8CB7]; see also Cecilia Kang, Tech Industry Pursues a Federal Privacy Law, on Its
Own Terms, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/26/technology/techindustry-federal-privacy-law.html [https://perma.cc/QKQ4-2J2N].
10. Jack Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and
New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1152, 1162 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free
Speech].
11. Id. at 1162.
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To prevent the fiduciaries from taking advantage of their clients, and to
facilitate rational reliance on professionals who offer services that are
universally needed but not universally capable of being performed, courts
and legislatures have created fiduciary duties of care, confidentiality, and
loyalty that forbid self-dealing and other abuses of this power dynamic.12
Balkin’s proposal would extend similar duties to entities that hold
themselves out as ensuring privacy to their users, or in situations where
consumers of a service or product that collects data reasonably believed
that their data would not be misused.13 Jonathan Zittrain has similarly
argued that given the ability of companies like Facebook to manipulate its
users for opaque purposes, fiduciary duties could prevent data collectors14
from self-dealing when their interests diverge from those of its users.15
Doctors, lawyers, investment advisors, and other professionals are not
permitted to act like “con men”16 toward the people who reasonably trust
them with their information. Balkin, Zittrain, and others argue that Uber,
AirBnb, or Venmo should not be able to either.17
Applying duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality to data collectors
injects a moral valence to broadly uphold users’ trust that U.S. privacy law
generally does not require, and reverses the current presumption that data
collectors generally bear no obligations to their users to a presumption that
they do.18 Under U.S. privacy law, a private actor that does not fall under
the specific definition of a narrowly defined sectoral statute can largely do
whatever it wants with the data it collects or otherwise obtains, provided
it does not lie about its actions and attract the attention of an overstretched

12. Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983).
13. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162.
14. Except where a more specific term is warranted, I generally refer to the practices of “data
collectors.” This is to emphasize that while outsized harms may come from certain sectors and the
incentives in need of remolding are primarily those of for-profit companies, the harms that a fiduciary
framework would aim to prevent come from all corners of the digital ecosystem. Non-profits,
universities, brick-and-mortar businesses and common carriers create many of the same types of issues
that the digital platform companies do, and cannot be exempted from an effective fiduciary framework.
15. Jonathan Zittrain, Engineering an Election, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 335, 340 (2014).
16. Jack Balkin & Jonathan Zittrain, A Grand Bargain to Make Tech Companies Trustworthy,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/10/information-fidu
ciary/502346/ [https://perma.cc/B7H2-BRHN].
17. See id.
18. Of course, U.S. privacy law already prohibits certain privacy-invasive practices. But the
conception of privacy as a good, the focus on an easily navigated regulatory landscape, and the fact
that the United States lacks a comprehensive privacy law have together created the understanding that
to the extent that people accept an invasive practice, the government has no legitimate basis to prohibit
it. Moreover, a rights-based approach assumes that the government has not only a basis but also an
interest in ensuring that a threshold of protection exists. A duty of care is not as strong, but it creates
the presumption of an obligation where one did not previously exist, while also adding a rights-like
valence.
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FTC.19 In contrast, the GDPR places the onus on companies to justify their
data collection and use, given its paramount objective of protecting
individual rights—but that law relies on constitutional rights to privacy
and data protection that are not present in U.S. law, and a different legal
and historical understanding of privacy.
Classifying data collectors as information fiduciaries would not
create an equivalent constitutional privacy right in the United States, like
the one supporting the GDPR, but it would help correct the power
imbalance between companies and individuals. Placing affirmative duties
on data collectors deters exploitation of users, while a regime of
“permissionless innovation” incentivizes it. Moreover, duties of care,
loyalty, and confidentiality can be crafted and interpreted to forbid a
broader array of digital harms that privacy law generally does not prevent,
such as digital discrimination and manipulation. At the same time, an
information fiduciary model may be more flexible and coalesce better with
existing U.S. privacy law than the GDPR can, particularly as the fiduciary
relationship arises in a commercial context and can accommodate the
fiduciary’s competing rights, professional objectives, and obligations that
are also worthy of protection.20 While U.S. privacy law often prioritizes
companies over individuals and the GDPR is built upon constitutional
rights against private entities that do not exist in U.S. law, an information
fiduciary model can accommodate certain commercial objectives
alongside a commitment to normative values such as privacy, autonomy,
and equality that the law should uphold.21
This Article will begin with a brief background on the concept of
information fiduciaries and traditional fiduciary law. It will then provide
an overview of the stark asymmetry between companies and individuals
in U.S. privacy law, including the marketplace focus of “consumer”
privacy, the limits of U.S. privacy law to protect individuals from evolving
digital harms, and weak enforcement. Part III will discuss the GDPR and
its focus on the fundamental privacy rights of data subjects. Part IV will
then describe how a fiduciary framework could coalesce with U.S. law
while strengthening protections for individuals, even without an
equivalent constitutional basis like the one undergirding the GDPR. Part
V will address additional considerations.

19. Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH.
L. REV. 431, 470 (2016).
20. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 12, at 802 (“A fiduciary society attempts to maximize both the
satisfaction of needs and the protection of freedom . . . . It permits the government to moderate
between altruistic goals and individualistic, selfish desires, as well as between the social goal of
increasing the common welfare and the individual desire to appropriate more than a ‘fair share.’”).
21. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND ON INFORMATION FIDUCIARIES
As this Article will explain, the U.S. model of privacy regulation and
the European model generally represent two extremes: “permissionless
innovation” on one end and a strong commitment to individual rights on
the other. Though divergent, the two approaches can still be mutually
compatible in certain ways, and U.S. law would benefit from many of the
legal innovations that the GDPR creates. State legislatures have already
begun to emulate certain aspects of the GDPR, and some state
constitutions already contain a right to privacy like the one undergirding
the European law.22
But even if there were sufficient appetite from policymakers to
incorporate the GDPR wholesale into federal law, the information
fiduciary model coalesces better with the U.S. legal ecosystem than the
GDPR can.23 The concept of the fiduciary is deliberately designed to
accommodate the needs and commercial prerogatives of the service
provider, while recognizing that exploitation of the recipient’s
vulnerability is inevitable, undesirable, and legally preventable.24 A
fiduciary framework would not go so far as to create an equivalent
constitutional right to privacy against private entities in the U.S., like the
constitutional right that undergirds the GDPR. But affirmative duties
based on the premise that individuals should be protected from digital
exploitation can help correct the power imbalance between data subjects
and data collectors, and transform how digital rights are understood.25
Even without relying on a constitutional right to privacy, an information
fiduciary framework would expand the kinds of harms that would be
protected, while injecting a moral valence into a policy discussion that
often lacks it. Finally, while this Article does not focus on the GDPR’s
incompatibility with U.S. law from a free expression standpoint, the
fiduciary model is better equipped to accommodate the First Amendment
in a way the GDPR is not.26 Ultimately, the information fiduciary model
22. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6. Eleven states have constitutional
rights to privacy. Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protectionsin-state-constitutions.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JZB-KHZC].
23. See, e.g., Tim Wu, An American Alternative to Europe’s Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/30/opinion/europe-america-privacy-gdpr.html [https://
perma.cc/NP8W-39LL].
24. See generally Frankel, supra note 12.
25. Compare with Frankel’s argument that “[as] the entrustor should pay only for the benefits
gained from the relation. . . . [F]air fiduciary law would shift the costs of protecting against abuse of
power away from the entrustor to the fiduciary and the courts.” Id. at 834.
26. JACK M. BALKIN, HOOVER INST., AEGIS SERIES PAPER NO. 1814, FIXING SOCIAL MEDIA’S
GRAND BARGAIN 14 (2018), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/balkin_webrea
dypdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/E5TW-G2XZ].
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provides distinct advantages over the status quo of U.S. law that are
inherent to the concept itself, but it also strikes a balance between the
divergent approaches to privacy on each side of the Atlantic,27 making it a
fitting approach to U.S. privacy governance in a GDPR world.
While there is no sole definition of what constitutes a fiduciary or
how the fiduciary relationship is created,28 it generally arises when a
person or entity relies on another with superior skills or knowledge for a
service that they cannot easily perform themselves, based on the latter’s
expertise.29 Providing a professional with sensitive information such that
she can perform a service the client is unable to perform herself necessarily
requires the fiduciary to have superior knowledge and makes her actions
difficult for the client to effectively monitor.30 The beneficiary must
therefore trust that the fiduciary will accomplish the beneficiary’s
objectives as promised, which the law secures by placing duties of loyalty,
care, and confidentiality on the fiduciary to prevent her from leveraging
that dynamic to her advantage. Relationships in different contexts may
give rise to different duties, but they typically include a duty of loyalty to
the client, a duty of confidentiality, and a duty of care.31 Classic examples
of the fiduciary relationship include a doctor’s duty to her patient, a lawyer
to her client,32 a union leader negotiating on behalf of workers,33 or a
trustee managing a trust on behalf of the trust’s beneficiary.34
From a public policy standpoint, the state has an interest in protecting
these relationships and ensuring that the client can rely on the fiduciary
without fear that her information would be compromised. Violations could
mean the suspension or forfeiture of a license to practice,35 the cost of the
27. A rough analogy can be drawn with Frankel’s description of classic fiduciary law: “[T]he
moral feature of fiduciary law forms a bridge between altruism and individualism by focusing on the
objectives towards which the fiduciary must aim.” Frankel, supra note 12, at 832. Similarly, the
information fiduciary model forms a bridge between the EU model’s more idealistic focus on rights
and the United States’ focus on corporate growth.
28. New fiduciary relationships have been created over time, and a new one would not be unusual
from the perspective of fiduciary law. See id. at 805.
29. See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162 (discussing information fiduciaries); Ariel
Dobkin, Information Fiduciaries in Practice: Data Privacy and User Expectations, 33 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1, 10 (2017) (defining fiduciaries); Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary
Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 519 (2015) (“Conventional fiduciary relationships are
formed between fiduciaries and beneficiaries, and found an interpersonal form of accountability,
realized through assignment of correlative rights and duties between the parties.”).
30. Frankel, supra note 12, at 803–04 (describing how specialization and pooling enabled the
development of the fiduciary relationship).
31. See Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1161.
32. Id.
33. Frankel, supra note 12, at 795.
34. Id. at 805–06.
35. See, e.g., MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T r. 10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017);
FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS., U.S. MEDICAL REGULATOR TRENDS AND ACTIONS 2018, at 7 (2018),
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disciplinary proceedings,36 tort liability for malpractice,37 or liability under
other state laws.38 The possibility of these kinds of punishment help to
deter fiduciaries from exploiting power imbalances to their advantage. In
addition to deterring violations by sanctioning errant fiduciaries, the law
further reflects this normative tradeoff by limiting First Amendment
protections for the fiduciary when she might otherwise wish to share the
client’s information39 or providing an evidentiary shield when she might
wish to avoid being legally compelled to divulge it.40
Ultimately, the relationship depends on trust: an expert seeking to
perform services based on her superior knowledge needs to give potential
clients a reason to trust her, and individuals seeking a service they
themselves cannot perform must be able to trust the fiduciary on a more
reliable basis than an irrational degree of good faith. The legal duties
supplied by the fiduciary relationship enable this reliance. The fiduciary
relationship is a commercial one—but with an unmistakably moral
valence.41
II. U.S. PRIVACY LAW
The information fiduciary model is a vivid contrast to the status quo
of U.S. privacy law. U.S. privacy protections are hobbled by U.S. privacy
law’s predominant objective of facilitating a robust environment for
technological innovation and philosophically weakened by a conception
of privacy as a good to be traded away, rather than a right to be protected.
While the federal Constitution provides rights to privacy from the
government, it does not provide the same protections for privacy from
private entities, contributing to a diminished perception of the normative
imperative of those protections in policy discussions.42 In the seeming
absence of a compelling basis to protect it, privacy from companies has
come to be discussed as a commodity or a privilege that individuals should
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/publications/us-medical-regulatory-trends-actions.pdf [htt
ps://perma.cc/D7GQ-LUT9].
36. See generally Neil Gordon, Misconduct and Punishment: State Disciplinary Authorities
Investigate Prosecutors Accused of Misconduct, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 24, 2018), https:
//publicintegrity.org/accountability/misconduct-and-punishment/ [https://perma.cc/YMZ5-J9FW].
37. See generally Caroline Forell & Anna Sortun, The Tort of Betrayal of Trust, 42 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 557 (2009) (detailing the tort regimes applicable to doctors and lawyers and arguing for
a betrayal-based cause of action).
38. See generally Robert Kutcher, Breach of Fiduciary Duties, in BUSINESS TORTS LITIGATION
1 (Ann E. Georgehead et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005).
39. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1161.
40. Id. at 1161 n.30.
41. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 11 (describing fiduciary law as “the law that governs the
professions”); Frankel, supra note 12, at 830–32.
42. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 133–34.
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always have the prerogative to give up, while regulation that in any way
inhibits their ability to do so is frequently decried as paternalistic and antiinnovation.43 The conception of privacy as a good rather than a right is
thus used to argue against strong consumer privacy protections that might
hinder corporate success.44 As the United States debates the merits of a
possible comprehensive privacy law, this focus on regulatory flexibility
for business is still heavily represented by the Trump Administration,45 its

43. See id. at 119; see also McGeveran, supra note 7, at 975 (describing the “libertarian”
approach to privacy taken by the U.S. Constitution); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 441
(critiquing the “harm fixation” in U.S. privacy law, arguing that “from this perspective, privacy is an
injury to be remedied, a cost to be balanced in the ledger book, a harm rather than an opportunity” and
noting that “critics of privacy regulation bemoan its toll on ‘innovation’ and ‘progress’”).
44. See, e.g., Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4 (“But if there are no harms, then data use restrictions
impose only costs and no benefits.”).
45. Tony Romm, The Trump Administration is Talking to Facebook and Google About Potential
Rules for Online Privacy, WASH. POST (July 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2018/07/27/trump-administration-is-working-new-proposal-protect-online-privacy/?utm_term=.0cd8
f9076e05 (White House Deputy Press Secretary stating that “the Trump Administration aims to craft
a consumer privacy protection policy that is the appropriate balance between privacy and
prosperity . . . .”); Senate Panel Opens Hearing on Crafting US Privacy Law, VOICE OF AMERICA
(Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.voanews.com/a/senate-panel-opens-hearing-on-crafting-us-privacylaw/4588164.html [https://perma.cc/D2TT-E9SK] (The same Deputy Press Secretary stating that the
White House “look[ed] forward to working with Congress on a legislative solution” that strikes “the
appropriate balance between privacy and prosperity . . . .”).
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agencies that work on privacy,46 and the tech companies47 and their
surrogates.48
46. See Request for Comments, 83 Fed. Reg. 48,600–01 (Sept. 21, 2018), (describing the
Trump’s Administration’s ideal approach to privacy as “a risk-management approach, one that affords
organizations flexibility and innovation in how to achieve these outcomes”); Federal Trade
Commission, Comment Letter on the National Telecommunications and Information Administration’s
Approach to Consumer Privacy 8–11 (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/
federal_trade_commission_staff_comment_to_ntia_11.9.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/C78C-QQJM]
(noting that the FTC supports “a balanced approach to privacy that weighs the risks of data misuse
with the benefits of data to innovation and competition,” that “any approach to privacy must also
consider how consumer data fuels innovation and competition,” and emphasizing that privacy
regulation should not unduly constrain innovation); Kang, supra note 9 (quoting David Redl, Assistant
Secretary for Communications and Information at NTIA, that “commitment to prosperity will be our
guide” on how privacy should be regulated); Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4; Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed.
Commc’n Comm’n, Remarks at the Newseum 1 (Dec. 12, 2017), https://transition.fcc.gov/
Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2017/db0427/DOC-344590A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L2MN-CTL7]
(calling the internet “the greatest free-market success story in history” in part due to the
Telecommunications Acts’ animating objective “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet . . . unfettered by Federal or State regulation”).
47. While for years the tech companies have taken a more explicitly anti-regulatory posture, the
current regulatory climate has produced a different strategy, namely a posture of cooperation and
openness to regulation as a means to stave off more significant regulatory intervention. See, e.g.,
Nicholas Confessore, The Unlikely Activists Who Took on Silicon Valley—And Won, N.Y. TIMES
MAG. (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/14/magazine/facebook-google-privacydata.html [https://perma.cc/6S5V-27YX] (describing the tech companies’ aggressive lobbying against
CCPA, and how the Cambridge Analytica revelations “forced Facebook to take complaints about
privacy more seriously—or, at least, to sound as if it did”); Sheera Frenkel et al., Delay, Deny and
Deflect: How Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html?rref=
collection%2Fbyline%2Fcecilia-kang [https://perma.cc/VMS7-QVW6] (describing how Facebook
“broke ranks with other tech companies, hoping the move would help repair relations on both sides of
the aisle” in its support for SESTA/FOSTA); Cecilia Kang & Sheera Frenkel, Facebook and Twitter
Have a Message for Lawmakers: We’re Trying, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/facebook-and-twitter-have-a-message-for-lawmakers-weretrying.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcecilia-kang [https://perma.cc/7U8U-FG2Q] (describing
the “conciliatory and apologetic approach” Sheryl Sandberg and Jack Dorsey planned to take as they
testified before Congress). Facebook has also presented a public face of being open to regulation while
quietly lobbying against it behind closed doors, as have other tech companies. Kang, supra note 9
(describing aggressive lobbying Facebook, Google, IBM, and others for a “kinder set of rules” and
how Facebook and Google “softened their resistance to a federal privacy law, as long as they were
deeply involved in writing the rules”); Lee Fang, Google and Facebook Are Quietly Fighting
California’s Privacy Rights Initiative, Emails Reveal, INTERCEPT (June 26, 2018), https://theintercept.
com/2018/06/26/google-and-facebook-are-quietly-fighting-californias-privacy-rights-initiativeemails-reveal/ [https://perma.cc/4SED-NQZ7] (describing how Facebook publicly supported CCPA
while lobbying California lawmakers and donating money, along with Google, AT&T, Microsoft,
Amazon, and Verizon, to defeat it).
48. See, e.g., Protecting the Privacy of Customers of Broadband and Other Telecommunications
Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 87,274–75 (Dec. 2, 2016) (describing the Final Rule nullifying the FCC’s
broadband privacy rule as “designed to protect consumer choice while giving broadband providers the
flexibility they need to continue to innovate”); Daniel Castro & Alan McQuinn, Info. Tech. &
Innovation Found., Comment Letter on the National Telecommunications and Information
Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy 4 (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/
ntia/publications/2018-ntia-privacy-comments-itif.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFS6-ND3K] (arguing that a
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The structural flaws of U.S. privacy law are exacerbated by the idea
of privacy as a good. Without a more legally and conceptually fulsome
right to privacy—rather than a right to trade it away—the basis for legal
reforms seems weaker, and the arguments for the status quo are given more
credence. The lack of a constitutional right to privacy from private entities
has thus helped facilitate the construction of a consumer privacy regime
primarily concerned with ease of compliance for companies, and shielded
it from more consumer-protective modifications. The patchy protections
of sectoral regulation, the failures of notice and choice without strong
enforcement to compensate for them, and the narrow definitions of what
kinds of harms merit judicial or administrative redress reflect this
conceptual and legal diminishment of privacy, and often keep protections
for it from being effective.
A. Sectoral Regulation
The fractal nature of privacy protections for individuals against
private entities in the United States largely reflects a prioritization of
corporate flexibility over individual rights. While an omnibus regime
assumes that data collection should be justified, a sectoral regime assumes
that any governmental limits on collection should be justified. As noted
above, privacy from private entities is generally not protected by the U.S.
Constitution.49 Instead, an array of sector-specific state and federal statutes
have established data collection and use limitations when legislatures
determine a specific need for that particular industry, rather than by
limitations on all data collection and use by default.50 Statutes like HIPAA,
FERPA, COPPA, GINA, GLBA and FCRA cover health information,51
students’ information,52 children’s online information,53 genetic
information,54 and financial information55 respectively.

federal privacy framework should “increase, not undermine, innovation,” including by considering
“the economic costs of any piece of privacy legislation or enforcement action,” as “[o]verly strict data
protection regulations can adversely impact innovation”).
49. As McGeveran notes in Friending the Privacy Regulator, courts have inferred rights to
privacy in discrete areas not explicit in the text, but “[t]his constitutional jurisprudence does not confer
any broad right to control personal information equivalent to European human rights to data
protection.” McGevran, supra note 7, at 976; see also Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 133–34.
50. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 973–74 (describing the “smorgasbord” of privacy statutes that
arose in response to “narrowly defined problems and [which] applies solely to the type of data
connected with that problem”); see also id. at 977 (“Consumer protection law is tied to the inequitable
nature of the underlying transaction, not to individual rights over personal data.”).
51. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2018).
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 6501 (2012).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff–5 (2012).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681, 6801 (2012).
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But even within the sectors that appear to be covered by pertinent
statutes, narrow definitions cabin the applicability of such laws and the
protections they appear to offer. For example, the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the statute governing collection of
student data, applies to public school officials or those they designate.56 It
does not apply to any other entity that collects student data, such as a
company that provides an official-looking survey as part of a test students
are required to take, and then sells the information to data brokers.57
Another example is the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
(GINA), the statute governing misuse of genetic data, which only prohibits
the use in employment or insurance decisions.58 While that is a good start,
it does nothing to curb the behavior of consumer genetics companies,
which are not otherwise subject to it, nor does it hamper any other use of
genetic information other than in the insurance or employment contexts.59
As another example, the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA), which protects health privacy, only applies
to information collected by a healthcare provider.60 Any other collection
or use of health information, for instance, by a healthcare startup selling
predictive judgments on patients to insurance companies, or a periodtracking app hawking assessments of the likelihood that its users will
conceive to their employers,61 is not covered by the law.62 Other sector-

56. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012 & Supp. V 2018).
57. See Catherine Gewertz, Students with Disabilities Sue ACT over Release of Personal
Information, EDUC. WEEK (Aug. 28, 2018), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/high_school_and_
beyond/2018/08/students_with_disabilities_sue_act_over_release_of_personal_information.html
[https://perma.cc/H88G-Y4JA] (describing a lawsuit brought by high school students alleging that the
standardized testing company ACT collected and sold information about their learning disabilities to
colleges. The suit rests on several federal and state laws, including the Americans with Disabilities
Act and the California constitutional right to privacy, but not FERPA); Natasha Singer, For Sale:
Survey Data on Millions of High School Students, N.Y. TIMES (July 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/07/29/business/for-sale-survey-data-on-millions-of-high-school-students.html
[https://
perma.cc/4666-X6BV] (describing how marketing programs collect and sell information about
students, untrammeled by FERPA).
58. See Megan Molteni, 23andMe’s Pharma Deals Have Been the Plan All Along, WIRED (Aug.
3, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/23andme-glaxosmithkline-pharma-deal/ [https://perma.cc/
3S8U-KSYV].
59. See, e.g., id.
60. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 162, 164 (2018).
61. Naomi Kresge, Ilya Khrennikov & David Ramli, Period-Tracking Apps Are Monetizing
Women’s Extremely Personal Data, BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-24/how-period-tracking-apps-are-monetizing-women-sextremely-personal-data [https://perma.cc/8QN9-MS6G].
62. See Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You—And It Could
Raise Your Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article/health-insurersare-vacuuming-up-details-about-you-and-it-could-raise-your-rates [https://perma.cc/X9B4-7G5Z];
Katie Thomas & Charles Ornstein, Sloan Kettering’s Cozy Deal with Start-Up Ignites a New Uproar,
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specific, definitionally limited federal privacy laws are the Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the two
primary federal statutes that govern financial privacy. These two laws
similarly rest on specific definitions of whom the law applies to and under
what context it applies to them. GLBA applies to financial institutions
(companies that offer consumers financial products or services like loans,
financial or investment advice, or insurance) but ultimately provides fairly
weak protections for consumers, as it simply requires covered entities to
give consumers a right to opt out of having their information shared.63 And
while FCRA offers somewhat stronger protections, it only applies to
consumer reporting agencies.64 Thus, when an entity not fitting those
descriptions—such as Facebook, Google, or a data broker—buys, sells, or
shares financial information, such as credit card transactions, GLBA and
FCRA do not apply. A sectoral approach means that entire areas are
necessarily left open for exploitation due to reasons as unsatisfying as
historical accident, industry pressure, or congressional inertia.65 These
narrowly defined laws also frequently fail to protect against new kinds of
digital harms, such as manipulation or discrimination.66
The priorities of a sectoral approach are clear. This approach asks
whether some new category of data must be regulated, because unless the
harm occurring in the absence of regulation is particularly severe, the
possible side effects of constraining industry practice should be considered
more harmful to society than the invasions of privacy that intervention
would seek to prevent.67 In comparison, a comprehensive privacy law
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/20/health/memorial-sloan-ketteringcancer-paige-ai.html [https://perma.cc/B42V-GEE6].
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012).
64. FED. TRADE COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting-act.pdf [https://perma.cc/
GLD9-586H].
65. See, e.g., Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 355, 360–61 (2015) (detailing the failures of various federal privacy bills, both
comprehensive and sectoral); Alvaro M. Bedoya, Why Silicon Valley Lobbyists Love Big, Broad
Privacy Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/opinion/siliconvalley-lobbyists-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/S8GT-W736].
66. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 62 (noting that HIPPA does not limit the ability of insurance
companies to surreptitiously use personal data purchased from data brokers to make medical
assumptions that could lead to increased insurance prices); Adam Entous & Ronan Farrow, Private
Mossad for Hire, NEW YORKER (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/02/18/
private-mossad-for-hire [https://perma.cc/83PT-SDC9] (describing the tactics of Israeli firms that
specialize in digital manipulation campaigns, and discussing those firms’ claims to legal legitimacy
and the extent to which “regulations haven’t kept pace with advances in technology”).
67. Confessore, supra note 47 (describing the anger and frustration of privacy advocates with
how industry pressure molded the Obama Administration’s comprehensive privacy framework until
it “retreat[ed] from the idea of consumer privacy as an inherent right,” and that “[m]ost of the bill’s
protections applied only if collecting or using a given piece of information posed a serious risk of
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starts with the premise that data practices should be prudently regulated to
ensure the right to privacy is protected, rather than regulated as sparingly
as possible.68 The comprehensive approach assumes that privacy has a
fundamental value for individuals, and the government should, as a part of
maximizing any number of normative objectives for its constituents,
ensure those protections. A sectoral approach prioritizes the ability of
industry to move fast and break things, and subordinates strong privacy
protections for individuals in favor of corporate flexibility to exploit
them.69
B. The Failure of Notice & Choice
U.S. privacy laws also suffer from weaknesses that are not uniquely
American, such as heavy reliance on notice and choice, a method of
privacy regulation which promises transparency and agency but delivers
neither. But while the GDPR still relies on notice and choice, it both
recognizes its weaknesses and provides compensatory measures to
account for them, such as requiring meaningful consent, prohibiting
services from being contingent on coercive consent, assessing high fines
for violations, and including transparency and access rights for
individuals, as well as meaningful methods of administrative and judicial
redress.70 In contrast, U.S. privacy laws lack most of these compensatory
measures, while still depending on the fiction that notice and choice
provides individuals with control over their digital selves.71
economic or emotional harm”); Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4 (“Government does the most good with
the fewest unintended side effects when it focuses on addressing actual or likely substantial consumer
injury instead of expending resources to prevent trivial or purely hypothetical injuries. . . . [I]f there
are no harms, then data use restrictions impose only costs and no benefits.”).
68. McGeveran, supra note 7, at 966 (characterizing the “default rule” for privacy regulation as
the most significant difference between the EU and U.S. regimes: “[I]n the United States, it is usually
allowed unless the law says that it is not, while in the E.U. it is not allowed unless the law says that it
is.”).
69. See, e.g., Oriana Senatore, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, Comment Letter on
FTC Informational Injury Workshop 3–4 (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_comments/2017/10/00023-141551.pdf [https://perma.cc/WF4T-LTAS] (“To fully
achieve the maximum positive impact, organizations must be able to collect, share, and use
information, subject to contractual limits and reasonable consumer protections to prevent fraud and
deception, on the one hand, and without the threat of over-burdensome and disproportionate
liability.”); Brookman, supra note 65, at 361 (describing a House hearing on comprehensive privacy
legislative “tellingly” titled “Internet Privacy: The Impact and Burden of EU Regulation” as part of
the “death knell” that rang for the law as soon as President Obama endorsed it).
70. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of Apr. 27, 2016 on the
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
art. 9(1), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 38 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
71. See generally James Cooper, Program on Economics & Privacy, Comment Letter on FTC
Information Injury Workshop (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
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Fundamentally, “notice and choice” is a misnomer when few privacy
notices offer sufficiently meaningful information capable of influencing
the user’s ultimate decision, and when a choice of whether to accept all
the terms offered or simply seek a different product is often no choice at
all.72 Notice and choice has been roundly criticized by policymakers,73
academics,74 social scientists,75 advocates,76 and others77 for quite some
time, and with good reason. The idea that a generic description of a
company’s practices could possibly provide a sufficient disclaimer as to
what data a company collects and how the data is used begs credulity;
considering that the description is generally written in ten-point font and
inscrutable legalese, is buried on the company’s website, and is one of an
unmanageable number that individuals encounter in a day, the proposition
is laughable. People encounter so many privacy policies in their daily lives
that it would be irrational to read each of them—one study calculated that
it would take the average person 200 hours per year.78 There are also all
kinds of cognitive phenomena that prevent individuals from obtaining
meaningful information from privacy policies in the way that a notice and

comments/2017/10/00019-141547.pdf [https://perma.cc/AN8M-VDG2] (arguing that the discrepancy
between stated preferences and outcomes in privacy decision-making mediated by notice and choice
should not compel strong privacy protections).
72. See, e.g., Kashmir Hill, Life Without the Tech Giants, GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2019), https://
gizmodo.com/life-without-the-tech-giants-1830258056 [https://perma.cc/6VT5-P9FR] (documenting
the veteran technology journalist’s struggle, and occasional failure, to completely extricate Amazon,
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Apple from her life).
73. Brian Fung, ‘Your User Agreement Sucks’: Mark Zuckerberg’s Senate Grilling, in 10 Key
Moments, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/
04/10/your-user-agreement-sucks-mark-zuckerbergs-senate-grilling-in-10-key-moments/?utm_term=
.e5b32914b30c [https://perma.cc/63MX-R9XE] (quoting Joe Kennedy criticizing Facebook’s privacy
policy by saying “your user agreement sucks”).
74. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4
J.L. & POL’Y INFO. SOC’Y 543 (2008); see, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, The Inadequate, Invaluable Fair
Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 952 n.1 (2017); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at
444 (describing the failure of notice and choice and criticizing the “control illusion”).
75. See generally Joel R. Reidenberg et al., Disagreeable Privacy Policies: Mismatches Between
Meaning and Users’ Understanding, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 39 (2015); Florencia Marotta-Wurgler,
Does “Notice and Choice” Disclosure Regulation Work? An Empirical Study of Privacy Policies (Apr.
2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.umich.edu/centersandprograms/lawandeconomics
/workshops/Documents/Paper13.Marotta-Wurgler.Does%20Notice%20and%20Choice%20Disclosur
e%20Work.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY8P-VUU5].
76. Electronic Privacy Information Center, Comment Letter on the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/epic-ntia-nov2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/
98Y3-STMJ].
77. Editorial, How Silicon Valley Puts the ‘Con’ in Consent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2019), https://
www.nytimes.com/2019/02/02/opinion/internet-facebook-google-consent.html
[https://perma.cc/
2XF6-ETJH].
78. McDonald & Cranor, supra note 74, at 564.
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choice regime assumes they do, such as hyperbolic discounting and
optimism bias.79
In addition to the difficulty of locating privacy policies, interpreting
them, and the other highly legitimate reasons that people have to not read
privacy policies at all, many people do not understand their purpose. One
survey found that 65% of respondents did not know that the statement
“[w]hen a website has a privacy policy, it means the site will not share my
information with other websites and companies without my permission”
was incorrect.80 Finally, “notice and choice” implies that a disclaimer
regime requires companies to offer alternatives to practices the individual
would prefer to prohibit. In reality, U.S. privacy policies are not required
to offer alternatives that would enable the person to still use the product or
service. It’s not notice and choice, it’s take it or leave it, and in most
situations, “leaving it” is not a practical or even feasible option.
The end result of a notice and choice regime is a feasible mechanism
for companies to demonstrate compliance, not a mechanism that
prioritizes that people understand how their information is collected or
used. The focus is on the procedure provided, not the outcome for the
individual. A legal regime that relies on notice and choice can compensate
for some of its weaknesses by providing additional rights for individuals,
such as a private right of action to sue when their rights are violated,
creating a higher threshold for what constitutes consent to a privacy policy,
or strengthening accountability measures by empowering regulators with
additional resources, enforcement powers, or expansive jurisdiction. The
GDPR employs these kinds of mechanisms that are intended to
compensate for the deficiencies of notice and choice. U.S. privacy law, for
the most part, does not.
C. The Limits of FTC Enforcement
U.S. privacy protections are further hobbled by another practical
limitation—the resources that are allocated for consumer privacy
policymaking and the kind of enforcement authority regulators are
permitted to wield. The Federal Trade Commission is the primary federal
agency charged with protecting individuals from digital exploitation in a
commercial context, including data privacy, security, and misuse by
companies.81 Its authority to police unfair and deceptive practices helps to
79. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1008 (2014)
(describing the literature on cognitive biases that skew rational consumer behavior, such as optimism
bias, information overload, anchoring, confirmation, and framing).
80. JOSEPH TURROW ET AL., THE TRADEOFF FALLACY 4 (2015), https://www.asc.upenn.edu/
sites/default/files/TradeoffFallacy_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/78ZC-FPL7].
81. State attorneys general also play an important role. See generally Danielle Citron, The
Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2017).
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fill in some of the gaps left by the sectoral regime. For example, while only
an employer or health insurance company’s use of genetic information is
subject to GINA, any company in the FTC’s jurisdiction that used the
information in a way that would constitute an unfair or deceptive trade
practice would be subject to the FTC’s oversight.82 Ultimately, the
agency’s ability to police abusive privacy practices is severely curtailed
by the limits of its statutory authority, its reactive rather than proactive
approach to shaping privacy practices, and the sheer size of the job in
comparison to the agency’s available manpower, legal tools, and monetary
resources.83 Reticence to enforce also seems to play a role.84
As the sole backstop for the weaknesses of the rest of U.S. consumer
privacy law, one agency can only do so much. To start, the FTC’s authority
does not include common carriers or non-profits, a limitation that some,
like former Commissioner Terrell McSweeny and current Chairman Joe
Simons, have argued should be lifted.85 In an echo of how sectoral privacy
laws leave broad swaths of conduct unregulated almost by happenstance,
the FTC’s lack of authority over common carriers leaves these entities free
to violate people’s privacy with near impunity. The agency also lacks
general rulemaking authority, which means that its approach to shaping
industry practice is primarily reactive, rather than proactive.86 It polices
industry practice on a case-by-case basis, in an approach that some have
argued resembles how the common law builds on precedent and

82. As well as being subject to state privacy and Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices
(UDAP) laws.
83. See, e.g., Hal Singer, The Latest Facebook Scandal Is Also a Crisis for the FTC, SLATE (Dec.
19, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/facebook-privacy-scandal-ftc-crisis.html [https://
perma.cc/NXF9-P428].
84. Cecilia Kang & Nicholas Confessore, Facebook Data Scandals Stoke Criticism That a
Privacy Watchdog Too Rarely Bites, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/30/technology/facebook-data-privacy-ftc.html?rref=collection%2Fbyline%2Fcecilia-kang&
action=click&contentCollection=undefined&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&
contentPlacement=1&pgtype=collection [https://perma.cc/JP8D-D5RT].
85. Terrell McSweeny, Psychographics, Predictive Analytics, Artificial Intelligence & Bots: Is
The FTC Keeping Pace?, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 514, 529 (2018); see also Oversight of the Federal
Trade Commission: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 115th Cong. 4
(2018) (responses to written questions submitted to Joseph J. Simons, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n),
https://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/f15ec1e0-e736-44ce-912c-cb3c2dcdef10/102
6963B4F5AA34FBDE922224104B601.majority-qfrs---joseph-j.-simons.pdf [https://perma.cc/97CJWB55] (“[T]he FTC could use broader enforcement authority to take action against common carriers
and nonprofits.”); McGeveran, supra note 7, at 977 (noting that the FTC’s authorities do not extend
to some financial institutions, telecommunications carriers, and airlines).
86. McSweeny, supra note 85, at 515 (describing the FTC as “the nation’s primary consumer
data protection agency”).
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establishes principles through the adjudication of individual
controversies.87
Further, the FTC typically uses its deception authority in privacy and
data security cases and rarely relies on its unfairness authority, with the
latter requiring the agency to reach the lofty threshold of “a clear theory
of substantial likelihood of harm to consumers that is not outweighed by
any countervailing benefits.”88 The outsized role of deception in the FTC’s
policy means privacy abuses are limited to whether or not a company is
forthright about its practices, regardless of whether the practice itself is
inherently abusive, and to an often overly narrow view of what kind of
injury constitutes a “material” harm.89 As the vast majority of privacy
policies are difficult to understand and rarely read, this reliance on
deception leaves the FTC’s enforcement as a fairly narrow sliver: an
entirely truthful privacy policy is still a capable shield for practices that
contravene consumer expectations or are otherwise exploitative.90
Moreover, the agency’s inability to level fines on the first instance of a
company’s malfeasance curtails its ability to deter such behavior.91
Even conduct that would appear to fit squarely within what the FTC
would enforce can go unpunished, whether it is because of the agency’s
narrow definitions of informational harm, its limited enforcement
authority, its lack of resources, or even institutional torpor.92 While data
87. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 583, 607 (2014).
88. McSweeny, supra note 85, at 522; see also G.S. Hans, Privacy Policies, Terms of Service,
and FTC Enforcement: Broadening Unfairness Regulation for a New Era, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 163, 165 (2012) (describing the FTC’s reticent approach to exercising its unfairness
authority in privacy enforcement and arguing for a more aggressive approach).
89. Katie McInnis, Consumers Union, Comment Letter to the FTC Informational Injury
Workshop 1–2 (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/
01/00039-142816.pdf [https://perma.cc/3R8C-EU2C] (noting that “injury” is not an element in
deception cases, and that “the Commission should not further hamstring itself in its mission to protect
consumer interests”); Ryan Calo, Privacy Harm Exceptionalism, 12 COLO. TECH. L.J. 361, 361–63
(2014).
90. Google and Facebook, for example, both were reportedly tracking user location despite
settings that would appear to indicate that tracking was not occurring. See Kashmir Hill, Turning Off
Facebook Location Tracking Doesn’t Stop It from Tracking Your Location, GIZMODO (Dec. 18, 2018),
https://gizmodo.com/turning-off-facebook-location-tracking-doesnt-stop-it-f-1831149148 [https://
perma.cc/ANC7-HR6A]; Ryan Nakashima, Google Tracks Your Movements, Like It or Not, AP NEWS
(Aug. 13, 2018), https://apnews.com/828aefab64d4411bac257a07c1af0ecb [https://perma.cc/B2CUVRLG].
91. McSweeny, supra note 85, at 529 (“The FTC is capable of continuing to adapt to the digital
age, but it must have the resources and tools to do so. As discussed above, Congress should grant the
FTC rulemaking and civil penalty authority to protect consumers’ privacy, security, and data rights.”).
92. Singer, supra note 83 (criticizing the FTC’s inertia on privacy enforcement and quoting
former FTC official Justin Brookman that the “FTC could theoretically try to address [targeting users
based on what they buy in the real world] under general Section 5 authority, but they haven’t tried and
it’s unclear if they would be successful if they did”) (emphasis in original).
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breaches continue to rise in ubiquity and scale,93 the action being taken to
deter or prevent them is often unclear or unsatisfying, particularly as the
FTC generally refuses to comment even on egregious cases.94
In a recent and notorious example, Facebook gave researchers
affiliated with British political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica
access to information on millions of its users without the users’ consent,
which Cambridge Analytica then used to attempt to persuade users to vote
for its clients.95 When Facebook found out what had happened, it hid that
information from regulators, users, and the public.96 This is an enormous
abuse of its users’ trust, and yet the question of whether the company
would be punished by the FTC was initially somehow still uncertain,97
despite the fact that the company was already under a consent decree with
the FTC for sharing user information with third parties without their
consent.98 While it now seems likely that Facebook will face a large
financial penalty for its misconduct, even a record-breaking fine may have
limited deterrent or punitive value.99 The largest privacy fine the FTC has
ever assessed is $22.5 million, against Google;100 Facebook’s revenue for
2018 was nearly $56 billion,101 making the likelihood of a fine that will

93. Mike Snider, Your Data Was Probably Stolen in Cyberattack in 2018—And You Should
Care, USA TODAY (last updated Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2018/
12/28/data-breaches-2018-billions-hit-growing-number-cyberattacks/2413411002/ [https://perma.cc/
H6PG-HYV8].
94. See, e.g., Taylor Telford & Craig Timberg, Marriott Discloses Massive Data Breach
Affecting up to 500 Million Guests, WASH. POST (Nov. 30, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/business/2018/11/30/marriott-discloses-massive-data-breach-impacting-million-guests/?utm_
term=.a6434b8a5dcf [https://perma.cc/9XDX-GRE5].
95. Matthew Rosenberg et al., How Trump Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analyticatrump-campaign.html.
96. Id.
97. David C. Vladeck, Facebook, Cambridge Analytica, and the Regulator’s Dilemma: Clueless
or Venal?, HARV. L. REV.: BLOG (Apr. 4, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/facebookcambridge-analytica-and-the-regulators-dilemma-clueless-or-venal/ [https://perma.cc/T9GT-FB4T]
(arguing that the consent decree was violated); FTC is Investigating Facebook over Cambridge
Analytica’s Use of Personal Data, Source Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.latimes.
com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-facebook-ftc-20180320-story.html [https://perma.cc/56H7-NKW4]
(“Facebook said in a statement that it rejects ‘any suggestion of violation of the consent decree.’”).
98. Vladeck, supra note 97.
99. Tony Romm, The U.S. Government and Facebook Are Negotiating a Record, Multibilliondollar Fine for the Company’s Privacy Lapses, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.washington
post.com/technology/2019/02/14/us-government-facebook-are-negotiating-record-multi-billiondollar-fine-companys-privacy-lapses/?utm_term=.82b5e2fdf4fb [https://perma.cc/KY33-F47U].
100. Id.
101. Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2019/Facebook-ReportsFourth-Quarter-and-Full-Year-2018-Results/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/HJP9-83HK].
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meaningfully change the company’s approach decidedly slim.102 As Chris
Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot and Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius also
note, no U.S. business has ever failed due to a regulatory fine imposed for
privacy violations.103
The Commission has often emphasized its incremental and case-bycase approach as deliberately laissez-faire, underlining that the agency’s
goal is to foster innovation as much as it is to protect consumers.104 But
protecting consumers in a twenty-first century economy where ubiquitous
commercial surveillance can both harm consumers and have anticompetitive effects requires an FTC that can prevent new kinds of
informational harms, not simply react to them.105 It requires an agency
with enough resources and staff to fulfill its own mission while assisting
other agencies that require its expertise to fulfill theirs.106 Moreover,
without significant curbs on their ability to abuse their market power, the
largest tech companies lack a check on abusive data practices because
people lack alternatives for the services they provide.107 Limited
102. Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What
It Is and What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 93 (2019); cf. David Steitfeld, Big Tech May
Look Troubled, but It’s Just Getting Started, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/01/01/technology/big-tech-troubled-just-getting-started.html [https://perma.cc/546X-3WDY]
(describing burgeoning growth among the tech giants despite backlash from consumers and
regulators).
103. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 93; cf. Steitfeld, supra note 102.
104. Olhausen, supra note 3, at 3.
105. See generally McSweeny, supra note 85.
106. Given the FTC’s expertise in privacy, it collaborates fairly frequently with other agencies
on public education and outreach, such as with the Department of Education, see, e.g., Student Privacy
and Ed Tech, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2017/12/student-privacy-ed-tech [https://perma.cc/4ECD-UMB8]; the National Highway
Traffic & Safety Administration, see, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FTC, NHTSA
Workshop to Focus on Privacy, Security Issues Related to Connected Cars (June 27, 2017),
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/06/ftc-nhtsa-workshop-focus-privacy-securityissues-related [https://perma.cc/88QW-AMG7]; the Department of Health and Human Services, see,
e.g., Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, FTC Releases New Guidance for Developers of Mobile
Health Apps (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/04/ftc-releasesnew-guidance-developers-mobile-health-apps [https://perma.cc/LPN6-39F3]; and is frequently
invoked as privacy guarantor by the FCC, see, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Statement
of FCC Chairman Ajit Pai on Cogressional Resolution of Disapproval of FCC Broadband Privacy
Regulations (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-pai-congressional-resolutiondisapproving-privacy-regs [https://perma.cc/Z5XY-DU7D].
107. See, e.g., Maurice Stucke, Should We Be Concerned About Data-Opolies?, 2 GEO. L. TECH.
REV. 275, 321 (2018); see also David Cicilline & Terrell McSweeny, Competition Is at the Heart of
Facebook’s Privacy Problem, WIRED (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/competition-isat-the-heart-of-facebooks-privacy-problem/ [https://perma.cc/5TXZ-2ZQW]. FTC Commissioner
Chopra has also argued for providing the agency with rulemaking power in order to bolster its
competition enforcement authority. See generally Competition and Consumer Protection in the 21st
Century: Hearing Before the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Sept. 6, 2018) (comment of Rohit Chopra,
Commissioner, Fed Trade Comm’n), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/
1408196/chopra_-_comment_to_hearing_1_9-6-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4U7-HLTN].
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competition in a market that rewards data collection and offers few
liabilities for possible resulting harms means that companies have no
incentive to improve the status quo.108 As it stands, the agency charged
with facilitating a competitive environment for innovation and protecting
consumers from exploitation is often unable, and sometimes even
unwilling,109 to effectively do either.
D. Narrow Definition of Harm
A limited definition of what constitutes a privacy “harm” is also
drawn from the idea of privacy as a good, rather than as a right, and further
limits the ability of U.S. privacy law to offer comprehensive protections
for individuals.110 Under that theory, vigorous privacy enforcement does
more harm than good because individuals should be able to trade away
their information under nearly all circumstances, and companies should
not be limited in their ability to coax them into doing so. A related
corollary holds that informational injuries should be narrowly defined so
as to include only the most egregious harms, such as physical injury or
theft.111 Limiting informational harms to physical or financial injuries
allows more insidious injuries to individuals, such as reputational harms,
108. See Cicilline & McSweeny, supra note 107; see also WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S
BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2018) (“The value of
personal data has led most companies to adopt a ‘collect first, ask questions later’ mentality. This
mentality incentivizes design choices that marginalize users’ interests in opacity and control over how
their data is collected and used.”); BALKIN, supra note 26, at 10.
109. Kang & Confessore, supra note 84.
110. Calo, supra note 89, at 363 (describing the narrow conception of privacy harms as an
“(impossibly) high bar that some jurists and scholars expect privacy harm to overcome” and
“suspicious”).
111. See Ensuring Customer Premises Equip. Backup Power for Continuity of Commc’ns, 29
FCC Rcd. 14,968, 15,038 (2014) (Pai, Comm’r, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]e must
act on concrete evidence, not hypothetical [privacy] harms.”); Geoffrey Manne, Int’l Ctr. for Law &
Econ., Remarks at the FTC Informational Injury Workshop (Dec. 12, 2017) (transcript available at
pages 96–97 of Informational Injury Workshop Transcript, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_events/1256463/informational_injury_workshop_transcript_with_index_12-2017
.pdf [https:perma.cc/F6VN-YT5S]); Olhausen, supra note 3, at 4 (“Government does the most good
with the fewest unintended side effects when it focuses on addressing actual or likely substantial
consumer injury instead of expending resources to prevent trivial or purely hypothetical injuries.”);
Cooper, supra note 71, at 5 (urging a narrow and “precise” approach to informational injury); U.S.
Chamber of Commerce, Comment Letter on The Informational Injury Workshop (Oct. 27, 2017),
https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/10.27.17_comments_to_ftc_on_informational_injury
_workshop.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TP8-MNQW] (“The Commission should use this Workshop as an
opportunity to adopt a regulatory framework that focuses on protecting consumers against concrete
consumer harms as opposed to merely conjectural or hypothetical injuries.”); The App Association,
Comment Letter on The Informational Injury Workshop (Oct. 27, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/
system/files/documents/public_comments/2017/10/00024-141552.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TNZ-7R8J]
(criticizing FTC investigations based on “hypothetical harms”).
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emotional harms, manipulation, or discrimination to persist. The FTC has
also relied on a constrained definition of informational harms despite the
fact that the bread-and-butter of its consumer privacy enforcement work,
deceptive trade practices, do not require a showing of harm.112
While the FTC does acknowledge harms beyond the physical and
financial,113 its limited definition of privacy harms has curtailed its ability
to protect consumers in the digital age, including by giving officials with
a more pro-business bent a legalistic reason not to advocate more
aggressively for consumers.114 The judiciary has created additional
barriers for individuals looking to vindicate their privacy rights by
enforcing narrow readings of standing doctrine, such that plaintiffs
struggle to bring privacy claims even in the rare cases where they are
afforded the right to do so by statute.115 The Supreme Court has ruled that
violation of a statute does not constitute per se injury such that the plaintiff
has standing to sue.116
An exhaustive list of the kinds of abuses that networked services
enable and current U.S. privacy law does not forbid would fill a decentsized encyclopedia, but a brief list of examples illustrates the range of
ongoing harms. Facebook conducted a study on how to manipulate the
mood of its users through its newsfeed without obtaining their consent or
informing participants that it was happening.117 A 2015 Carnegie Mellon
study found that Google was more likely to target ads for high-income jobs
to men than it was to women,118 while a 2013 study found that Google
112. Calo, supra note 89, at 364.
113. Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59
B.C. L. REV. 423, 487 (2018) (“[N]arrow definitions of consumer injury that focus on traditional
injuries, such as financial, health or safety harms, may not sufficiently account for intangible harms
suffered by consumers as a result of ‘privacy and data security missteps.’”).
114. Kang & Confessore, supra note 84 (“Ms. Ohlhausen’s staff told enforcement officials to
slow down on cases, so the White House would not view her as anti-business, according to a former
senior official. . . . With limited resources, she said, the F.T.C. should ‘pursue cases where the
evidence of actual or likely consumer harms is strongest.’”).
115. See Brookman, supra note 65, at 365 (describing courts “narrowing the concept of Article
III standing” as another avenue through which privacy protections in the United States are continuing
to erode); Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of Data-Breach
Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 748 (2016).
116. Spokeo v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016); Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 443
(noting state and federal courts’ ever-narrowing approach to interpreting privacy harms).
117. See Gail Sullivan, Sheryl Sandberg Not Sorry for Facebook Mood Manipulation Study,
WASH. POST (July 3, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/07/03/
sheryl-sandberg-not-sorry-for-facebook-mood-manipulation-study/?utm_term=.68197efa25ce [https:
//perma.cc/AWZ3-BQ7H]; David Gorski, Did Facebook and PNAS Violate Human Research
Protections in an Unethical Experiment?, SCI.-BASED MED. (June 30, 2014), https://sciencebasedm
edicine.org/did-facebook-and-pnas-violate-human-research-protections-in-an-unethical-experiment/
[https://perma.cc/5LHU-E3GJ].
118. Amit Datta et al., Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,
Choice, and Discrimination, PROC. ON PRIVACY ENHANCING TECHS., Apr. 1, 2015, at 92.
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searches for names common in the black community were much more
likely to have target ads for arrest records databases.119 Uber once threated
to smear a journalist based on its knowledge of her whereabouts from
using its app,120 and the New York Times reported that Uber uses
psychological tricks and gamification to get its drivers to work longer
hours.121 And a marketing company recently drew angry headlines for
offering a consumer service that would attempt to influence women
through targeted advertising to pursue sex with their husbands more
frequently.122
While some of these harms might fall into what the FTC would
consider deceptive conduct, or be forbidden under other laws, the agency’s
limited resources and narrow definition of harm make it highly unlikely
that it would take enforcement action against these companies for the
conduct described. Other misconduct—like Facebook failing to protect
black users from being disproportionately targeted by Russian
misinformation operations,123 or Uber attempting to manipulate its
contractors into working longer hours124—does not cleanly fit under the
umbrella of a material harm due to deceptive conduct per the agency’s
definition at all, making it even less likely that an inert agency will
investigate misconduct it sees as on the edge of its authority. Without
regulators (or plaintiffs) to hold them accountable, companies continue to
employ a range of techniques to wheedle their users into playing or
scrolling longer, sharing more private information, or spending more

119. Latanya Sweeney, Discrimination in Online Ad Delivery 1 (Jan. 28, 2013) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Harvard University, Data Privacy Lab), https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/
onlineads/1071-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/NP46-SBGQ].
120. Jacob Kastrenakes, Uber Executive Casually Threatens Journalist with Smear Campaign,
THE VERGE (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.theverge.com/2014/11/18/7240215/uber-exec-casuallythreatens-sarah-lacy-with-smear-campaign [https://perma.cc/49DW-6T6D].
121. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers’ Buttons, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/02/technology/uber-driverspsychological-tricks.html [https://perma.cc/K8QF-VJNM].
122. Fiona Tapp, New Service Promises to Manipulate Your Wife into Having Sex with You,
ROLLING STONE (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/spinnerservice-manipulate-wife-sex-712385/ [https://perma.cc/8MW8-L2GE].
123. RENEE DIRESTA ET AL., NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS & TROPES OF THE INTERNET
RESEARCH AGENCY 8 (2018), https://disinformationreport.blob.core.windows.net/disinformationreport/NewKnowledge-Disinformation-Report-Whitepaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SH9-MLNS].
124. Scheiber, supra note 121.
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money,125 while the design of their platforms frequently enables or
outright incentivizes discrimination, harassment, or extremism.126
As this Section has briefly illustrated, the weaknesses of U.S. privacy
law are heavily influenced by a policy approach that seeks to minimize the
dangers of privacy violations, such that strong consumer protections are
characterized as a barrier to innovation rather than a necessary safeguard.
The laissez-faire approach to privacy regulation—and the prioritization of
corporate flexibility over individual rights—is reflected on a macro scale
in the choice of sectoral regulation over comprehensive privacy regulation,
and on the micro scale with the default of most privacy laws allowing data
collection—as opposed to a default requirement that data collection should
be justified. The framing of privacy as a good that individuals should be
able to trade away without limit, the narrow definition of digital harm, the
inefficacy of notice and choice, and a legally and practically constrained
FTC keep the law from sufficiently protecting individuals from evolving
digital threats.
III. GDPR
The inspiration for the General Data Protection Regulation stands in
clear contrast to that of U.S. privacy law: it is a framework that is primarily
focused on the rights of the data subject and the imperative of protecting
her, rather than on retroactively correcting whatever collateral damage
results from facilitating the success of industries built on consumer
surveillance.127 The law is not a panacea for all digital harms and has been
subject to critique on a range of issues.128 But the philosophical and legal
125. See FORBRUKERRÅDET, DECEIVED BY DESIGN: HOW TECH COMPANIES USE DARK
PATTERNS TO DISCOURAGE US FROM EXERCISING OUR RIGHTS TO PRIVACY (2018), https://
fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2YJS-EZFG]; Marisa Meyer et al., Advertising in Young Children’s Apps: A Content
Analysis, 40 J. DEV. BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 32 (2019); Henry Farrell, It’s No Accident that Facebook is
so Addictive, WASH. POST (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2
018/08/06/its-no-accident-that-facebook-is-so-addictive/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.887db14b684e
[https://perma.cc/5ZJA-5JM7].
126. See REBECCA LEWIS, DATA & SOCIETY, ALTERNATIVE INFLUENCE: DOCUMENTING THE
REACTIONARY RIGHT ON YOUTUBE (2018), https://datasociety.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/DS_
Alternative_Influence.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM9C-2KG6]; OLIVIER SYLVAIN, KNIGHT FIRST
AMENDMENT INST., DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON USER DATA (2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/
sites/default/files/content/Sylvain_Emerging_Threats.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3RJ-FGTJ].
127. See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 70, Recital 1, at 1 (“The protection of natural persons in relation
to the processing of personal data is a fundamental right.”).
128. See Glyn Moody, ICANN Loses Yet Again in Its Quixotic Quest to Obtain a Special
Exemption from the EU’s GDPR, TECHDIRT (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20180808/03340740390/icann-loses-yet-again-quixotic-quest-to-obtain-special-exemption-eus-gdpr.
shtml [https://perma.cc/N5M5-C7S3]; Europe’s History Explains Why It Will Never Produce a
Google, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 2018), https://www.economist.com/europe/2018/10/13/europes-histo
ry-explains-why-it-will-never-produce-a-google?frsc=dg%7Ce [https://perma.cc/EA9V-EJPB].
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underpinnings of the GDPR’s balance of competing interests are based on
a fundamental, constitutional right to privacy and data protection that
anchors the law in a commitment to individuals first and industry second,
which does not exist in U.S. privacy law.129
A. Background on the Regulation
While the EU conception of privacy as a fundamental right arose
before World War II, the atrocities to dignity and autonomy committed
during the war created the impetus for the right to privacy to be formally
codified in the Declaration of Human Rights,130 the European Convention
on Human Rights,131 and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.132 Following
the creation of the European Union, the EU Data Protection Directive, a
precursor to the GDPR, further created the legal framework for a
streamlined digital single market in the EU with a recognition of the
fundamental right to privacy created by the ECHR.133 The EU Data
Protection Directive relies on transposition to implement the goals of the
Directive—the EU set the overarching objectives, but the member states
can implement variations of the law’s requirements, provided the domestic
legislation meets minimum standards.134 The Treaty of Lisbon made the
right to privacy and the right to data protection constitutional rights
binding on the member states.135 The connection to human rights law gives
privacy in the EU an additional measure of gravity that the U.S. framing
of a “consumer’s” data lacks.136
129. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 70 (discussing the normative tradition of the GDPR
and distinguishing the rights to data protection and privacy) (“Data protection focuses on whether data
is used fairly and with due process while privacy preserves the Athenian ideal of private life.”); id. at
72 (“The GDPR sets normative preferences in tension with information-intensive industry practices,
particularly those performed by third parties.”).
130. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 12 (Dec. 10, 1948).
131. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
132. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, arts. 7–8, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10
[hereinafter EU Charter of Fundamental Rights] (Article 7 includes respect for private and family life,
and Article 8 contains protections of personal data.).
133. Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, repealed by GDPR, supra note 70, art. 94, at 86.
134. Marc Rotenberg & David Jacobs, Updating the Law of Information Privacy: The New
Framework of the European Union, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 617–18 (2013).
135. See Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing
the European Community art. 16B, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 51; EU Charter of Fundamental
Rights, supra note 132, arts. 7–8, at 10.
136. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 66 (quoting one of the drafters of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the EU, Stefano Rodota, describing the GDPR as a digital Magna Carta, with
a corresponding online habeas corpus right, and noting, “These commitments germinated long before
the rise of contemporary Silicon Valley data companies but have only intensified as such companies
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The GDPR takes these commitments one step further. As a
regulation, rather than a directive, its provisions are directly binding on
member states, which, as Paul Schwartz and Karl-Nikolaus Peifer note in
their insightful article comparing the EU and U.S. privacy regimes, reflects
the primacy of the data subject in EU privacy law.137 Both EU privacy law
and the substance of the GDPR reflect this primary commitment to data
subjects with a comparative disregard for industry prerogatives that would
make a U.S. industry lobbyist blanch.138 The preamble of the Regulation
also makes this commitment clear.139
B. The GDPR’s Protections for Privacy & Data Protection Rights
The GDPR is not entirely one-sided: it focuses both on the rights of
individuals, and on simplifying the data protection regime for European
businesses in a strengthened digital market. However, in both philosophy
and substance, the law is primarily committed to the rights of individuals
to control their information.140 To start, the GDPR flips the presumption
of U.S. privacy law—a data controller must have a legal basis to collect
data, as opposed to collection being permitted unless it has been
specifically prohibited.141 The law’s capacious definitions similarly reflect
a default presumption of protection and a commitment to privacy as a right
as opposed to a consumer good. Not only does U.S. privacy law
distinguish privacy from private entities from privacy from the
government in a way European law does not, the characterization of a
“consumer” protection focuses on the subject’s use of a good or service.142
In contrast to the general characterization of a “consumer” right and the
definition in many U.S. privacy statutes of subjects as “consumers” or

have gained dominance.”); McGeveran, supra note 7, at 967 (describing the moral dimensions of EU
data protection law); id. at 969 (describing the European legal conception of control of personal
information as “a human right of the highest order”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 123–27
(describing the history and status of privacy and data protection law in the EU and noting “European
data protection law is strongly anchored at the constitutional level. Its goal is to protect individuals
from risks to personhood caused by the processing of personal data, and its favored mode of discourse
is rights talk. When it discusses privacy, it uses the language of human rights to develop protections
for its data subjects.”).
137. Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 129.
138. Id. at 129–31 (“Free flow of information matters, but not as much, ultimately, as the
safeguarding of dignity, privacy, and data protection in the European rights regime.”).
139. GDPR, supra note 70, Recital 1, at 1 (“The protection of natural persons in relation to the
processing of personal data is a fundamental right.”).
140. Id. art. 1(2), at 32 (“This Regulation protects fundamental rights and freedoms of natural
persons and in particular their right to the protection of personal data.”).
141. Id. art. 6, at 36.
142. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 132 nn.106–07 and accompanying text.
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“subscribers,” the GDPR generally applies to data subjects regardless of
whether any kind of transaction has taken place, with a few exceptions.143
The GDPR prioritizes ensuring that data collection adheres to the
subjects’ expectations and that they have control over their information
rather than focusing on how onerous establishing the basis for lawful
processing may be.144 Much has been made, for example, of the GDPR’s
requirements for obtaining consent, and how those might inhibit business
practices.145 The GDPR places a much higher bar for what constitutes
consent, acknowledging that check-the-box clickwrap hardly ever
constitutes meaningful decision-making. Controllers need consent for the
“[p]rocessing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership,
and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of
uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be
prohibited.”146 Consent must be freely given, specific and informed,
subjects must be able to withdraw it, and receipt of a service must not be
conditioned on providing it.147 Preventing companies from relying on
vague privacy policies which consumers must accept in order to use the
product is a key part of giving individuals any kind of meaningful rights
over their information, as well as an important element of correcting the
inadequacies of notice and choice described above.148
The law also sets broad parameters for the definitions of key terms,
such as what constitutes “personal data” and “processing.” Personal data
is “any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
(‘data subject’),” while “an identifiable natural person” is defined as “one
who can be identified . . . in particular by reference to an identifier such as
a name, an identification number, location data, an online identifier or to
one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person.”149
143. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 3(2), at 33 (“This Regulation applies to the processing of personal
data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the Union,
where the processing activities are related to: (a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of
whether a payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or (b) the
monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour takes place within the Union.”) (emphasis
added).
144. See Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at 131 (“In this regime, economic interest in
information and benefits on the ‘supply side’ regarding technology are not particularly important.”).
145. See, e.g., Sohin Gautam, 21st Century Problems: Will the European Union Data Reform
Properly Balance Its Citizens’ Business Interests and Privacy Rights?, 21 SW. J. INT’L L. 195 (2014).
146. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 9(1), at 38.
147. Id. art. 7, at 37.
148. See supra Part I.
149. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 4(1), at 33.
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“Processing” is defined as “any operation or set of operations which is
performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by
automated means.”150 The end result is that the majority of data is personal
data, or is capable of becoming it, and nearly anything done with data is
considered to be “processing,” though the law exempts “purely personal
or household activity” as well as national security.151 In a similar reflection
of how the definitions of the law are primarily concerned with the rights
of individuals rather than the compliance obligations of businesses,
requirements are not calibrated to the size of the business, as small
businesses that handle sensitive data still have the potential to abuse it.152
The GDPR’s jurisdiction is similarly broad.153
The law further reflects a normative commitment to enshrining
meaningful rights to privacy and data protection for individuals by
codifying proactive access, correction, and objection rights. The GDPR
gives individuals the right to know whether their information is being
processed, to receive information about the processing, and to be provided
with a copy of what has been processed.154 Individuals also have a right to
data portability and to rectify inaccuracies in the information controllers
collect about them.155 Other rights include the right to restrict processing,
the right to object to processing taking place, and the right to erasure, also
known as “the right to be forgotten.”156 The GDPR also recognizes the
modern concerns of automated decision-makingfully automated
profiling that can “produce legal effects or significantly affect” the subject
is prohibited157 unless there is a contract between subject and controller,
and the processing is either authorized by law with suitable safeguard or
based on the subject’s consent.158 Some of these rights are represented in
U.S. law, many are not, and they are limited to the sector-specific statute

150. Id. art. 4(2), at 33.
151. Id. art. 2(2)(c), at 32; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 75.
152. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 73.
153. The GDPR applies to any entity that processes personal data “in the context of the activities
of an establishment of a controller or a processor in the Union”—regardless of whether or not the
processing occurs on EU soil—and to any entity that processes the data of EU subjects in order to
offer them goods and services or to monitor their behavior. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 3(1)–(2), at 32–
33.
154. Id. art. 15, at 43.
155. Id. art. 16, at 43; id. Recital 68, at 13.
156. Id. art. 17, at 43–44.
157. Id. art. 22(1), at 46; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 90 n.212 and accompanying
texts (discussing scholarly interpretation of the relevant provision).
158. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 22(2), at 46.
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rather than broadly applicable to nearly all processed information.159
Others, like the right to data portability, are new.160
In addition to the substantive prohibitions and requirements the
GDPR enacted to strengthen individual privacy rights, it also created a
substantial enforcement regime to ensure its protections and prohibitions
are a meaningful check on industry conduct. Violations of certain rules
can trigger fines of up to 2% of global turnover, while more egregious
violations can trigger fines of up to 4%.161 The ability of individuals to
receive judicial redress for violations also gives the GDPR teeth that U.S.
privacy laws frequently lack, given that many U.S. privacy laws lack a
private right of action. Even the laws that do have a private right of action
still face a narrow approach to standing doctrine that often keeps privacy
plaintiffs out of court, due to a limited definition of what constitutes
“injury.”162 Under the GDPR, individuals can file complaints with Data
Protection Authorities (DPAs), just as they can file them with the FTC in
the United States, but the GDPR also provides an explicit right to an
effective judicial remedy for data subjects, as well as creating a collective
action mechanism.163 Unlike the FTC, DPAs are also required to hear the
complaints individuals file with them.164
Ultimately, the GDPR is a vast improvement on the Pollockian
splattering of half-hearted statutes that protect privacy in the United States.
It creates substantive rights to protect individuals from privacy invasions
and the harms that can result from opaque automated processing. It also
creates a significant enforcement regime to give those rights meaning and
incentivizes compliance. But in addition to a basis in an almost
diametrically opposed legal and political tradition,165 the GDPR’s
commitment to individual privacy is supported by a comprehensive
constitutional right to privacy and data protection that does not exist in
U.S. law. An approach that bridges the gap between the U.S. laissez-faire
approach to privacy regulation, and the prescriptive, rights-based
European approach, can coalesce with the U.S. model while emulating the

159. COPPA, for example, affords parents the right to request that their children’s data be
deleted, and requires service providers to notify parents of that right. 16 C.F.R. § 312.4 (2018).
160. GDPR, supra note 80, Recital 68, at 13; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 89.
161. Id. art. 83(4)–(5), at 82–83.
162. See Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 94.
163. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 80(1), at 81.
164. Id. art. 57(1)(f), at 68.
165. See generally Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 72 (“[T]he GDPR has a dual goal of
promoting the free flow of personal data within the EU (to help businesses), and protecting people and
their personal data. Yet, the GDPR emphasizes the latter goal.”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3, at
131 (“Data protection law does not concern itself greatly with how its protection of the data subject
might negatively impact useful activities of data processors.”).
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GDPR’s commitment to individual rights—and perhaps even provide
additional protections.
IV. APPLYING FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO DATA COLLECTORS
As this Article has attempted to illustrate, the philosophies and legal
traditions behind the U.S. and European approaches to privacy regulation
are distinct. The constitutional right to privacy and data protection in the
EU places a high premium on how privacy is understood in policy
discussions, and unsurprisingly, the GDPR is animated by an
appropriately lofty commitment to meaningful protections for individuals
that will actually be enforced. In contrast, the U.S. understanding of
privacy as a good rather than a right minimizes the normative value of
protections for it, while the increasingly narrow legal recourses for
enforcing the few rights that do exist heavily limit their efficacy. Against
this backdrop, an information fiduciary framework can strike the
necessary balance of competing objectives: it is designed to balance
commercial prerogatives with meaningful protections for individuals in
the way that U.S. privacy law attempts, yet fails, to do. Moreover, the
framing of data collectors owing affirmative duties to individuals injects a
moral valence that the U.S. emphasis on privacy as a good otherwise
eschews, as well as creating a presumption of obligations owed to
individuals that does not currently exist.
Like traditional fiduciaries, companies that collect enormous
amounts of data on individuals have a strategic advantage over their clients
due to the fact that they are trusted with the user’s sensitive information,
in addition to superior and specialized knowledge, lack of transparency,
and the reliance of their users on the specialized services provided.166
Given a highly consolidated market and the low risk that enforcement
poses to profitability, companies have every incentive in the world to

166. See generally Lindsey Barrett, Model(ing) Privacy: Empirical Approaches to Privacy Law
and Governance, 35 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 17–20 (2018) (describing the informational
asymmetry between data collectors and the people relying on them for products and services, as well
as the inability of individual users to understand or monitor their conduct due to structural challenges
like lack of transparency); Lina Khan, Sources of Tech Platform Power, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 325,
329 (2018) (discussing the power tech companies hold, including “information exploitation” of their
users in discriminatory or privacy-invasive ways); Karen Levy & Solon Barocas, Designing Against
Discrimination in Online Markets, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1183, 1186 (2017) (discussing the power
of networked platforms to deliberately discriminate or unintentionally facilitate discrimination against
its users); K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and the Revival
of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1669 (2018) (describing the “unique kind
of platform power” companies like Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Uber hold over the users,
employees, and third parties that rely on their services).
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leverage that asymmetry in their favor, and often do.167 The ways that data
collectors can take advantage of their subjects extends far beyond lying
about data collection and use, and the harms extend beyond what privacy
law generally protects, such as manipulation and discrimination.168
Individuals deserve meaningful protections against violations of their
privacy, and against the manipulation, exploitation, discrimination, and
other harms that digital platforms are uniquely positioned to directly
perpetrate or indirectly enable. A duty not to discriminate or manipulate
also speaks to objectives similar to the GDPR’s ban on fully automated
decision-making based on profiling, given the risks to dignity and
autonomy of reducing people to a series of opaque, and often biased,
statistical evaluations.169
Crucially, applying fiduciary duties to data collectors would raise the
bar of how digital companies are expected to treat their users’ information.
It would help adjust the objective of U.S. privacy law to more heavily
prioritize the rights of the user, while still accounting for the commercial
prerogatives of the collector. Fiduciary duties for doctors and lawyers have
always recognized that legitimate professional objectives can coexist with
the client’s need for certain rights to be respected—a balance that can be
wrought in the digital context as well. Duties of loyalty, care, and
confidentiality can also prohibit digital harms such as manipulation,
discrimination, and other harms that laws exclusively focused on privacy
are ill-equipped to prevent, while still permitting non-harmful commercial
activity.
The following Sections will describe what form an information
fiduciary framework could take, and what it would need to incorporate in
order to provide meaningful protections and change existing incentives for
data collectors. They address why it is necessary for a fiduciary status to
be compulsory, the importance of distinguishing between traditional and
information fiduciaries, and what the duties of loyalty, care, and
confidentiality could entail, including how those duties could expand the
definitions of digital harm, and provide the basis for less trivial
enforcement. Finally, they will address how an information fiduciary
167. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 2–3 (noting the economic incentives of social media
companies to promote engaging content “even if it is polarizing, false, or demagogic” and the capacity
of bad actors to take advantage of that dynamic); id. at 4 (noting the economic incentives of social
media companies to manipulate their users and to allow other to do it); Khan, supra note 166, at 325–
28 (discussing the gatekeeper and leverage power of online platforms against their competitors).
168. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 450–51 (describing how information disclosure
creates vulnerabilities that data collectors can leverage in their benefit and to their users’ detriment).
169. INFO. COMM’R’S OFFICE, GUIDE TO THE GENERAL DATA PROTECTING REGULATION 149
(Aug. 2018), https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulati
on-gdpr-1-0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YWJ-YZJZ].

2019]

Confiding in Con Men

1089

framework should approach both direct harms and negligent ones enabled
by the design of the platform, or through lax enforcement of its policies.
A. Distinguishing Traditional Fiduciaries
As Balkin and Zittrain have noted, fiduciary duties for data collectors
must be tailored to the context they are being created for, and both have
argued that the expectations of good faith and fair dealing for information
fiduciaries should be lower than what is expected of traditional
fiduciaries.170 Traditional fiduciaries are generally prohibited from
benefitting from their clients’ information in a way that could hurt the
client: using client information to enrich themselves in a way that
disadvantages the client would violate the duty of loyalty, and sharing it
beyond prescribed limits would violate the duty of confidentiality.171 Yet
for certain business models, like social media companies or data brokers,
profiting from their users’ information seems like the very foundation of
the product data collectors provide. Certainly, any application of fiduciary
duties to data collectors would need to distinguish the kinds of conduct
that are inherent to the service—such as a search engine “discriminating”
by sorting through information and only providing the responsive
results—from disloyal conduct designed to benefit the data collector to the
detriment of the subject.172 And as with traditional fiduciaries, the extent
of the duty should also correspond to the degree of power imbalance, as
Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog argue, as should the severity of the
punishment for violating it.173
Granted, the degree of trust that users place in a cloud service or a
social media platform is often different from the trust they place in a doctor
or a lawyer, as the services and vulnerabilities are different.174 But the
information such a company holds can be no less sensitive by virtue of
seeming more banal. Providing your location so that an Uber can take you
to a bar is a transaction of much more limited scope and gravity than telling
your lawyer incriminating details she intends to use for your defense. The
balance shifts when you take an Uber to a more sensitive location, such as
a protest site, an abortion clinic, or a temple, or when the information is
used in aggregate to piece together your movements over a period of time,

170. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162; see also Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 16.
171. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 15.
172. See Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 470 (distinguishing the relationship of a data
collector and subject from a traditional fiduciary and the client).
173. Id. at 458; Frankel, supra note 12, at 825.
174. Frankel, supra note 12, at 825 (“These rules vary with the extent of the entrustor's
vulnerability to abuse.”); id. at 832 (“[T]he degree of moral culpability of the fiduciary is positively
related to the extent of the entrustor’s helplessness.”).
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or to be turned over to law enforcement.175 The balance is shifted even
further after considering that any information that Uber stores could be
used by the company to enrich itself at your expense or to shut out
competitors, be breached by a hacker, accessed by law enforcement, or
used to blackmail you.
A key distinction between the expectations attached to traditional
fiduciaries and how data collectors have been permitted to function is the
presumption of an obligation of good faith and fair dealing in the absence
of specific proscriptions.176 There is a space between the loyalty and good
faith one reasonably expects from a doctor or lawyer, and what one expects
from the various companies that provide digital products and services. But
that space exists because of the legal vacuum that has allowed data
collectors to invade, exploit, and manipulate with impunity, not because
the vulnerability of their users will always be smaller than that of a
doctor’s patients, or because a lawyer’s ability to abuse her power over her
clients is always greater than the power tech platforms wield over their
users. Information fiduciary duties must be created with an eye for context,
but not the flat assumption that the power dynamic between an individual
and an online banking provider, an ISP, a picture storage service, a dating
platform, or any other digital intermediary lacks the kind of moral valence
that classic fiduciary relationships have been deemed to have, or the same
potential for abuse of power.
It is also worth emphasizing that while the contexts in which different
professions have developed fiduciary principles are distinct, that does not
render a fiduciary approach inapposite for data collectors. The principles
behind conflicts of interest rules in medicine or law are not so morally
lofty and restrictive that they are inherently inapplicable to the context of
data collectors—quite the opposite.177 The ethical codes governing doctors
and lawyers both provide leeway for conduct that does not entirely
subordinate the fiduciary’s interest to the client’s when the two conflict.178
175. See generally RACHEL LEVINSON-WALDERMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
CELLPHONES, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 2–3 (2018), https://www.
brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018_12_CellSurveillanceV3.pdf [https://perma.cc/
HJD6-UMLG] (discussing the collection of cellphone location data and law enforcement use of it);
Tonya Riley, Civil Rights Groups Aren’t Impressed by Facebook’s Efforts to Fight Discrimination,
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2018/12/facebook-civil-righ
ts-audit-color-of-change-russian-disinformation-african-americans/ [https://perma.cc/6X7P-ZUGM].
176. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1162.
177. See generally Forell & Sortun, supra note 37 (criticizing the insufficiency of existing
methods of regulating the conduct of doctors and lawyers and arguing for a tort based on betrayal by
fiduciaries in those professions).
178. A striking example of this is the medical tradition of allowing medical students to perform
pelvic exams on unconscious female patients for the sake of the students’ education, when the patients
have not been informed that the exam would take place. Phoebe Friesen, Why Are Pelvic Exams on
Unconscious, Unconsenting Women Still Part of Medical Training?, SLATE (Oct. 30, 2018), https://
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In their thorough and thoughtful critique of the information fiduciary
model, Lina Khan and David Pozen argue that any business model that
relies on behavioral advertising is antithetical with a requirement that the
fiduciary place the client’s interests above her own, underlining the point
with a hypothetical “Dr. Marta Zuckerberg” who derives her income from
“enabling third parties to market [her patients] goods and services.”179 Yet
the pharmaceutical industry’s influence on prescribing practices make this
hypothetical very real, as do the conflicting incentives of doctors with a
financial stake in the medical devices they recommend.180 One need not
imagine a hypothetical Dr. Zuckerberg who derives income from
recommending products to patients when lawsuits and reporting have
clearly demonstrated the role that Purdue Pharma’s sales tactics have
played in creating the opioid crisis.181 The ethical rules governing conflicts
of interest for lawyers are also far from iron-clad. Lawyers are prohibited
from using their client’s information to disadvantage the client—but may
do so if the client provides informed consent.182 There is certainly a range
of critiques that can be leveled against how existing fiduciary rules
accommodate conflicted conduct, but these fields are hardly strangers to
the kind of inherent conflicts implicated by data collection.183 Fiduciary
rules are flexible to professional prerogatives, but they are not toothless,
and they implicate a moral dimension to the regulation of commercial
conduct that other consumer protection regulation does not automatically

slate.com/technology/2018/10/pelvic-exams-unconscious-women-medical-training-consent.html [htt
ps://perma.cc/L4WT-QGS3] (citing Stephanie Schniederjan & G. Kevin Donovan, Ethics Versus
Education: Pelvic Exams on Anesthetized Women, 98 J. OKLA. ST. MED. ASS’N 386 (2005)).
179. Lina Khan & David Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries, 133 HARV. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 13) (on file with Harvard Law Review).
180. Forell & Sortun, supra note 37, at 559 (describing the conflicts of interest created by the
pharmaceutical industry and the lack of legal ramifications); Nancy J. Moore, What Doctors Can
Learn from Lawyers About Conflicts of Interest, 81 B.U. L. REV. 445, 455 (2001) (discussing the
conflict of interest in doctors receiving monetary incentives for enrolling their patients in clinical
trials).
181. Michael Forsythe & Walt Bogdanich, McKinsey Advised Purdue Pharma How to
‘Turbocharge’ Opiod Sales, Lawsuit Says, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/201
9/02/01/business/purdue-pharma-mckinsey-oxycontin-opiods.html [https://perma.cc/9PKV-QMAR]
(“McKinsey also recommended that Purdue redirect its sales force to focus on doctors who were
especially prolific prescribers of OxyContin, according to the suit. One slide made public by the
attorney general’s office, attributed to McKinsey, focused on one doctor in the town of Wareham,
Mass., who almost doubled his annual output of OxyContin prescriptions after a big increase in visits
from Purdue sales representatives.”); Barry Meier, Sacklers Directed Efforts to Mislead Public About
OxyContin, Court Filing Claims, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/
health/sacklers-purdue-oxycontin-opioids.html [https://perma.cc/C2FB-MLMJ] (describing the
Massachusetts lawsuit claiming that Purdue “aggressively” promoted the drug to doctors who were
big opioid prescribers).
182. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY r. 1.8 cmt. 5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
183. Contra Khan & Pozen, supra note 179, at 13.
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invoke, and which much of the U.S. discourse around privacy as a good
attempts to repudiate.
Ultimately, the fact that the business models of many tech companies
seem to be predicated on exploitation of their users simply demonstrates
the aspects of those businesses that an information fiduciary framework
would prohibit, not that an information fiduciary framework is logically
incoherent. Exploitation of users’ information should not be required for
digital products and services to function, and for most of them, it is not. A
social network need not be inherently manipulative, discriminatory, or
privacy-invasive—the same is true for an internet service provider, a
rideshare company, a medical device company, or a cloud service. A
media company can rely on subscriptions;184 a search engine can rely on
contextual advertising.185 To the extent that behavioral advertising or
renting out user information to third parties undermines a duty of loyalty,
that does not mean that a fiduciary model cannot be applied to data
collectors; it means that exploitative practices will be prohibited, and nonexploitative services and products will not be.
B. Compulsory Fiduciary Duties
In order to be effective, any attempt to characterize data collectors as
information fiduciaries must be compulsory rather than optional. Both
Balkin and Zittrain suggest that a fiduciary framework could be opt-in,
with a law that would preempt state privacy laws for the companies that
choose to join.186 This approach would certainly bolster the political
feasibility of any fiduciary proposal, and the looming deadline of a new
privacy law in California has made tech companies claim to be more
amenable towards a new comprehensive, federal privacy law than they

184. Jenny Luna, Why Every Business Will Soon Be a Subscription Business, STAN. BUS.:
INSIGHTS (Aug. 17, 2018), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/why-every-business-will-soon-besubscription-business [https://perma.cc/QX88-EDC6] (describing the rise of subscription-based
business models).
185. Natasha Lomas, The Case Against Behavioral Advertising Is Stacking Up, TECHCRUNCH
(Jan. 24, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/20/dont-be-creepy/ [https://perma.cc/UF56-J9MW]
(describing the success of DuckDuckGo, which relies on search-based ads rather than behavioral
advertising based on the information it collects from its users); see also Jessica Davies, After GDPR,
The New York Times Cut Off Ad Exchanges in Europe—And Kept Growing Ad Revenue, DIGIDAY
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://digiday.com/media/new-york-times-gdpr-cut-off-ad-exchanges-europe-adrevenue/ [https://perma.cc/W6WP-8S5E] (describing how the New York Times switched to contextual
advertising from behavioral advertising in order to comply with the GDPR and saw its advertising
revenues rise).
186. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 15; Balkin & Zittrain, supra note 16; Zittrain, supra note 15, at
340.
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have been in the past.187 But a voluntary regime shaped by the lobbyists
for the companies it would purport to regulate will be subject to the same
broad provisions and tepid commitments of other self-regulatory programs
that have been largely ineffective.188 The result is a catch-22—either the
new federal law is too weak to be impactful in order to coax companies to
join the safe harbor, or the law creates meaningful protections and
enforcement, and the companies have no reason to join.189
While an opt-in regime seems temptingly seamless, I share the
skepticism that Lina Kahn and David Pozen express in their appropriately
titled essay that it could produce the kind of meaningful change the digital
ecosystem so desperately needs.190 Rather than a significant realignment
in incentives and philosophy, the result will be additional lip service by
some companies to privacy (and ammunition against further enforcement
or regulation), no change from others, and little impact on the status quo
for individuals.191 The U.S. privacy landscape is far too skewed towards
corporate priorities for a program industry-friendly enough to tempt
voluntary compliance to be capable of restoring the equilibrium. For a
fiduciary framework to have real force, it must apply compulsory duties
for information fiduciaries, and provide for real enforcement when those
duties are violated.
187. Kang, supra note 9 (describing the lobbying efforts of Facebook, IBM, Microsoft and other
companies to cajole Congress into preempting state privacy laws for a gentler federal one in the wake
of CCPA’s passage); see also sources cited supra note 47.
188. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 12, at 816 (arguing that self-regulatory organizations
incentivize members to “minimiz[e] the burdens of self-regulation” and is an incomplete solution to
the problems the fiduciary relationship would seek to solve).
189. See, e.g., Margot Kaminski, When the Default Is No Penalty: Negotiating Privacy at the
NTIA, 93 DEN. L. REV. 925, 946 (“Coupled with evidence from the NTIA negotiations thus far, this
suggests that both the current penalties and the current levels and kinds of uncertainty in the U.S.
privacy regime are not enough to drive industry to the table in efficiency-maximizing ways.”).
190. Khan & Pozen, supra note 179, at 29–30. I do, however, respectfully disagree with the
authors that a fiduciary approach precludes the kinds of structural reforms that they argue, and I fullheartedly agree, are needed, provided the fiduciary characterization is mandatory, and the framework
includes additional mechanisms to change the incentives around data abuses. These incentives include
rulemaking and civil penalty authority for the FTC (or broad authority and considerable resources for
a new data protection agency), access to the courts through a private right of action for individuals, an
expanded definition of digital injury, and other reforms that Balkin and Zittrain’s framework either
does not specifically address or excludes.
191. See Frankel, supra note 12, at 816 (noting the limits of self-regulatory organizations in
preventing abuse of power by fiduciaries, given that “[i]ts members may be interested in minimizing
the burdens of self-regulation and maximizing the benefits of the organization’s monopoly”); id. at
832 (“[T]he degree of moral culpability of the fiduciary is positively related to the extent of the
entrustor’s helplessness.”). Privacy policy is certainly no stranger to the failures of self-regulation. See
generally Brookman, supra note 65, at 362–63 (The cycle of “once interest in legislation perks up on
Capitol Hill, industry scrambles to demonstrate its own capacity to address the problem itself. Once
Congress’s attention has waned or turned to other matters, however, industry momentum toward
meaningful rules often falls by the wayside” has repeatedly failed in the privacy space.).
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C. Information Fiduciary Duties: Loyalty, Care, Confidentiality
Generally, any information fiduciary framework should require
duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality, though there is a range of what
specific obligations those duties could entail. Balkin argues for duties of
care, loyalty, and confidentiality,192 characterizing the primary obligation
of the information fiduciaries as not acting like a “con artist” by inducing
trust in their users to obtain their information, then using that information
to the benefit of the fiduciary and the detriment of the user, in violation of
that trust.193 As an example, fiduciaries should be prohibited from
“hold[ing] themselves out as providing digital safety and respecting digital
privacy and then manipulat[ing] and discriminat[ing] against their endusers,” and prohibited from sharing or selling data from or about their
users to entities not subject to its fiduciary duties.194 Zittrain focuses on
the political dimensions of manipulation, stating that “a central
responsibility of an information intermediary would be to serve up others’
data in ways not designed to further the political goals of the
intermediary.”195 The Data Care Act, a comprehensive legislative
framework recently proposed by Senator Brian Schatz and fourteen other
senators, sketches out broad duties of loyalty, care, and confidentiality,
while providing the FTC with rulemaking authority to determine the
details.196 In a relevant and cogent article advocating for the role of trust
in privacy law, Neil Richards and Woodrow Hartzog discuss the value of
incorporating duties of loyalty, confidentiality, and care into privacy law,
though they do not argue for a scheme of compulsory fiduciary duties per
se.197
Ariel Dobkin proposes a more granular framework, arguing that
informational fiduciary duties should be divided into four categories of
behavior: manipulation, discrimination, sharing with third parties without
consent, and violations of a company’s privacy policy.198 A duty is
violated when the fiduciary exceeds a reasonable user’s expectations,
which those types of conduct will generally do.199 These four types of
conduct are more specific elaborations of the broader fiduciary duties—
duties of confidentiality and loyalty would likely cover violations of the
company’s privacy policy, for example. Dobkin’s discussion of duties not
192. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 13.
193. Jack Balkin, 2016 Sidley Austin Distinguished Lecture on Big Data Law and Policy: The
Three Laws of Robotics in the Age of Big Data, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1218, 1229 (2016).
194. Id. at 1229–30.
195. Zittrain, supra note 15, at 340.
196. Data Care Act of 2018, S. 3744, 115th Cong. §§ 2–3 (2018) [hereinafter Data Care Act].
197. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 457–58.
198. Dobkin, supra note 29, at 17.
199. Id.
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to discriminate or manipulate also demonstrates how fiduciary duties
would protect against not just privacy harms, but a broader definition of
digital injuries, as does Balkin’s inclusion of manipulation and
discrimination from the kinds of harms his framework would prohibit, and
Zittrain’s description of “digital gerrymandering.”200 These proposals
reflect the range of what an information fiduciary framework could
incorporate in terms of scope, ambition, and stringency.
D. Expand the Definition of Digital Harm, and Who Can Be
Held Responsible for It
The proposals discussed above offer a variety of approaches to direct
and negligent harms, and the types of digital harms that information
fiduciary duties would prohibit. In order to effectively guard against the
full gamut of digital harms not covered by existing law, an information
fiduciary framework must expand the notion of digital harm beyond
unauthorized disclosure of information, and physical and monetary
harms—indeed, beyond privacy. In addition, the architecture of the online
ecosystem requires an approach to fiduciary duties that does not focus on
direct conduct alone: fiduciaries should also not be permitted to enable the
manipulation, discrimination, or privacy violations of users stemming
from unreasonably lax enforcement of their own policies, or design
choices that enable those harms. The following Sections will address how
fiduciary duties could incorporate a more expansive definition of privacy
harms, including a broader definition of digital harms more generally, such
as discrimination and manipulation, and how fiduciaries could be applied
to address the problem of diffuse responsibility.
1. Diffuse Responsibility
For an information fiduciary framework to be effective, it will need
to respond to the way large platforms, smaller players, and third-party
services create a tangled web of interactions resulting in direct and indirect
harms to users. In addition, the negligence of internet platforms in policing
the spaces they provide for misconduct has led to a slew of problems, and
an effective information fiduciary framework must tackle not only the
direct actions of data collectors, but also the harms that passivity can
perpetuate. Architectural choices that facilitate user harms and failure to
enforce a service’s policies often overlap, and the result is platforms that
facilitate harassment, manipulation, and discrimination, thanks to a
negligent failure to see how products built for good can easily be used for

200. Zittrain, supra note 15, at 335.
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evil, along with a healthy dose of monetary self-interest.201 For a few
examples, Twitter’s lax enforcement and opaque policies concerning
harassment have led women, activists, and other targeted groups to leave
the site rather than endure the abuse202—or continue to endure the slurs
and death threats at great effort, cost, and risk to their personal safety.203
Design choices on Airbnb led to widespread problems of bias on that
platform.204 And Facebook’s failure to devote sufficient resources to
content moderation in Myanmar contributed to a violent genocide.205
Platforms turning a blind eye as third parties violate their policies or
otherwise hurt users is a big part of how companies may indirectly
perpetuate harms. Certainly, lax enforcement makes perfect sense in an
environment where platforms want as many users as possible, as many app
purchases as possible, and as many ad clicks as possible.206 Established
companies want to entrench their dominant positions, while up-andcomers want to join their ranks or establish metrics to secure the next
round of funding. Problems like a recommendation algorithm that suggests
ever more extreme content207 or accounts that create high levels of
engagement through harassing other users pose a collateral risk while
contributing to tech companies’ bottom lines.208 Meanwhile, tech
companies promise to do better, but fail to make meaningful changes
because the status quo is more profitable. A fiduciary framework should
consider how companies can make their services and products safely
usable by everyone, not just those with the wherewithal to survive the
201. See, e.g., Ari Ezra Waldman, Manipulating Trust on Facebook, 29 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REV. 175, 185 (2017) (“Facebook has a strong financial interest in not only what we share, but in
encouraging us to share as much personal information as possible: the more data it has, the better it
can target its ads, and the more revenue it can earn.”); Mark Bergen, YouTube Executives Ignored
Warnings, Letting Toxic Videos Run Rampant, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.
com/news/features/2019-04-02/youtube-executives-ignored-warnings-letting-toxic-videos-runrampant (describing “corporate leadership unable or unwilling to act on these internal alarms
[regarding how the YouTube algorithm inculcated and spread extremist content] for fear of throttling
engagement”).
202. Simon Parkin, Gamergate: A Scandal Erupts in the Video Game Community, NEW YORKER
(Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/annals-of-technology/gamergate-scandal-eruptsvideo-game-community [https://perma.cc/7JNK-RULN].
203. Sarah Jeong (@sarahjeong), TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2018, 1:28 PM), https://twitter.com/
sarahjeong/status/1075140792765734912 [https://perma.cc/WC8W-7CNQ].
204. See Levy & Barocas, supra note 166.
205. See generally LEWIS, supra note 126.
206. See, e.g., Nicholas Confessore & Gabriel J.X. Dance, On Social Media, Lax Enforcement
Lets Imposter Accounts Thrive, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/20/
technology/social-media-impostor-accounts.html [https://perma.cc/8VBL-3L3P].
207. See, e.g., Zeynep Tufekci, YouTube, the Great Radicalizer, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/10/opinion/sunday/youtube-politics-radical.html
[https://perma.cc/QTW6-S5AX].
208. See, e.g., Confessore & Dance, supra note 206.
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inevitable toxicity, particularly when the harms may not be fully avoidable
by anyone.
As implemented in a fiduciary framework, a prohibition on
negligently creating or incentivizing a dangerous environment would
likely come under the duties of care or loyalty. The Data Care Act defines
the duty of loyalty as prohibiting fiduciaries from using “individual
identifying data or data derived from individual identifying data” in a way
that would “benefit [the fiduciary] to the detriment of the end user” if it
would “result in reasonably foreseeable and material physical or financial
harm to an end user” or “be unexpected and highly offensive to a
reasonable end user,”209 one or the other. That definition of harm is fairly
narrow, and should not be limited to physical or financial injuries.
Dignitary and other harms that are not necessarily physical or financial
could also be “unexpected and highly offensive to the reasonable person,”
but given the difficulty of accurately gauging digital mores—and how high
the threshold of “highly offensive” could be set—the bill’s definition of
harm should be more capacious.
2. Privacy Harms
In addition to expanding the notion of legally cognizable digital
harms, an effective information fiduciary framework should expand the
definition of what a privacy harm is. It should also strengthen existing
protections, such as more meaningful obligations to enact reasonable
security protocols, and stricter requirements to notify users in the case of
breach. These objectives could be met by a combination of the duties of
care, loyalty, and confidentiality. A data breach resulting from
unauthorized access to a poorly secured system is one harm that would
likely be both squarely prohibited by fiduciary duties and firmly within
what U.S. privacy law already prohibits.210 The duty of care under the Data
Care Act, for example, is primarily focused on a federal standard (and
different application) of securing data and breach notifications, which are
already covered by a range of laws.211 Richards and Hartzog argue that the
duty of confidentiality could be parsed into different levels of obligation
in order to better tailor the traditional duty for the data collector context,

209. Data Care Act, supra note 196, § 3(b)(2).
210. See generally Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept.
29, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/securitybreach-notification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/XL5D-S863].
211. The Data Care Act’s duty of care requires service providers to “reasonably secure individual
identifying data from unauthorized access” and “promptly inform” users in the case of unauthorized
access to individually identifying information under the duty of care. Data Care Act, supra note
196, § 3(b)(1).
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which they divide into “nondisclosure, limited disclosure, trustworthy
recipients, and obfuscation to be discreet.”212
Additionally, an effective information fiduciary framework should
not make the definition of a privacy harm contingent on physical or
monetary injury. While the FTC’s efficacy has been limited by a lack of
civil penalty authority and a greater need for resources, it is also hamstrung
by a limited approach to defining informational harm, despite the fact that
many digital harms do not involve financial loss or necessarily involve an
imminent risk to physical safety.213 In other cases, with an FTC more
inclined to protect industry over consumers, a narrow definition of
informational injury simply provides an excuse for anemic enforcement.214
Expanding the definition of what constitutes a privacy harm to more
broadly include non-financial injuries is particularly crucial as so many
digital products and services do not require users to pay for the service.215
Provided the definition was not unnecessarily cabined to financial or
physical harm,216 a duty of confidentiality would extend to privacy
invasions that the FTC has appeared to not consider within its purview
because of its narrow interpretation of informational injury.
The GDPR provides a broad definition for cognizable injury, as any
data subject has “the right to an effective judicial remedy where he or she
considers that his or her rights . . . have been infringed” as the result of
processing, or as the result of a company not complying with the law,217
and violating any of the GDPR’s many requirements for providers and
specific rights for consumers could constitute grounds for a hefty fine.218
A fiduciary framework would likely not expand the basis for a cognizable
privacy harm quite that far, and would be somewhat limited by courts’
application of Spokeo.219
The duty of care, confidentiality, or loyalty would prohibit many of
the invasive practices permitted under current law, or which go
unpunished by an under-resourced, or simply inert, FTC. A key change to
212. Richards & Hartzog, supra note 19, at 460–61.
213. See supra Section II.C.
214. Confessore & Kang, supra note 84 (noting that an FTC official rejected the concerns of his
staff over undisclosed location tracking by “respond[ing] that the tech companies were legitimate
businesses offering free services, and it was unclear how they had harmed consumers”).
215. Id.
216. Cf. Data Care Act, supra note 196, § 3(b)(2).
217. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 79(1), at 80.
218. Id. art. 83(2)–(5), at 82–83; see also Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 93.
219. See Solove & Citron, supra note 115, at 743–44 (detailing Spokeo’s holding that courts
must find an injury in fact for plaintiffs to have standing to sue); id. at 761–74 (explaining the legal
basis for how risk and anxiety stemming from data breach constitute such an injury); see also Matthew
S. DeLuca, The Hunt for Privacy Harms After Spokeo, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2439, 2468 (discussing
new theories of privacy harms a post-Spokeo court could rely on).
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privacy enforcement would be the current challenge of relying on
deception to effectively regulate privacy, which can leave no legal
recourse for victims simply because a company informed them (in fine
print, of course) that it could invade their privacy.220 As duties of care,
loyalty, and confidentiality would protect users regardless of whatever fine
print obfuscation companies use to attempt to trick them, a fiduciary
framework could actually improve upon the GDPR’s attempts to fix notice
and choice.221
Fundamentally, a higher legal obligation to users would help shift the
default attitude of data collectors from “collect everything and ask
questions later,” as would holding the service provider responsible for
enabling privacy invasions by third parties. As both Balkin and the Data
Care Act propose, fiduciaries should be required to contractually obligate
any third parties they share data with to uphold the fiduciary duties they
owe their users.222 As Balkin puts it, “fiduciary obligations must run with
the data.”223 As one small example, Facebook reportedly shared user
information with so many third parties that many were unaware that they
even had access to so much information.224 Affirmative legal duties to
users, like a prohibition on sharing their information except with entities
required to uphold the fiduciary’s same duties, would vastly limit
incentives to share information as recklessly as companies like Facebook
have. Companies that serve as a data hose to other services—Google,
Facebook, data brokers, and other entities—would also bear a
responsibility to the individuals whose data they are sharing that it would
not be used to their detriment. This resembles the GDPR’s holding data
collectors responsible for the actions of the entities it contracts with,225 as
well as the law’s disfavoring of third-party data sharing.226A broader
definition of privacy harms and a shift in the default assumption that a
company owes duties to its users, as opposed to a default that they do not,
would be a key shift in the balance of power between individuals and the
companies taking advantage of them.
220. See Brookman, supra note 65, at 358–59 (describing the FTC’s approach to deception as
creating an enforcement regime of “don’t go out of your way to lie about what you do” and that even
despite relatively increased vigilance from the FTC, it lacks “the capacity by itself to enshrine all of
the Fair Information Practice Principles into U.S. law”).
221. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 14.
222. Data Care Act, supra note 196, § 3(b)(3); see also BALKIN, supra note 26, at 3.
223. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 13.
224. Gabriel J.X. Dance, Michael LaForgia & Nicholas Confessore, As Facebook Raised a
Privacy Wall, It Carved an Opening for Tech Giants, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2018), https://www.
nytimes.com/2018/12/18/technology/facebook-privacy.html?module=inline [https://perma.cc/2EDUB6PQ].
225. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 68; see also id. at 96.
226. Id. at 74.

1100

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 42:1057

3. Beyond Privacy Harms: Manipulation & Discrimination
In addition to expanding the kinds of legally cognizable privacy
harms, an information fiduciary framework should also address
manipulation and discrimination in order to ensure that people are
protected from the full array of modern digital threats that they face. While
defining manipulation can be fraught, certain attributes can be combined
to a definition that the law should prohibit without being severely overinclusive. Building on Ryan Calo’s work on digital manipulation, Ido
Kilovaty argues that the kind of manipulation that should be subject to
legal limitations is hidden from the subject, exploits the subject’s
vulnerabilities, is targeted to her with the objective of changing her
behavior or outlook, and warrants intervention when the manipulator is
leveraging her divergent interests over the subject.227 Dobkin highlights
two definitions of problematic manipulation: conduct that ignores the
dignity or autonomy of the subject and conduct that subverts the welfare
of the user to the welfare of the data collector when their interests
diverge.228 Balkin provides yet another definition, characterizing
manipulation as “techniques of persuasion and influence that (1) prey on
another person’s emotional vulnerabilities and lack of knowledge (2) to
benefit oneself or one’s allies and (3) reduce the welfare of the other
person.”229 As Balkin and others argue, while manipulation is hardly new
as a commercial concept, digital companies have the ability and incentive
to manipulate their users in a particularly dangerous and impactful way.230
These definitions all contribute important facets to what a definition
of manipulation should include. I would argue that persuasive tactics
targeted to the user, designed to exploit her vulnerability and intended to
change her conduct or outlook when the interests of the subject and the
provider diverge, should constitute manipulation and violate the duty of
loyalty. Manipulation that preys on normative values like autonomy,
equality, and dignity could exacerbate the egregiousness of the violation,
as would manipulation based on a protected group status or activity.
Manipulation for ideological purposes, commercial purposes, or both
would violate the duty. Given the diffuse nature of networked products
and services, hosting a platform or service that facilitates manipulation by
227. Ido Kilovaty, Legally Cognizable Manipulation, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2019)
(manuscript at 16) (on file with Berkeley Technology Law Journal) (discussing different definitions
of manipulation and the worthiness of each of legal intervention); see also id. at 18 (citing Calo, supra
note 79, at 1023). Kilovaty further argues that his proposal to recognize certain kinds of manipulation
as a harm under data breach laws would accomplish goals similar to Balkin’s fiduciary framework. Id.
at 45–46.
228. Dobkin, supra note 29, at 19.
229. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 4.
230. Id. at 4–5.
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other users or by third parties could sometimes violate the duty of loyalty,
and should generally violate the duty of care.
As an example, an entity that purports to provide a “neutral” product
or service but quietly subjects users to a deliberate ideological campaign
would be engaging in manipulation that should violate the duty of loyalty.
Pushing an ideological agenda with the objective of changing the user’s
perception of an issue or shaping their actions is the company placing its
welfare above that of its users, based on the user’s lack of awareness of
the service’s ultimate objective. As an example, Dobkin describes the
hypothetical of Walmart promoting an anti-abortion agenda by
configuring its website to direct ads featuring “adorable babies” if the user
searches for “birth control,” and says that scenario would not violate her
principle of anti-manipulation if the company was subjecting all users to
those tactics rather than some.231 That framing conflates manipulation with
discrimination, and the latter should not have to exist for the former to be
found. Moreover, targeting can be implicit: Walmart can easily bank on
the assumption that women of child-bearing age seeking information
about contraception are a sizeable proportion, if not the majority, of the
users searching its site for “birth control.” Deliberate, obfuscated
ideological skewing of a purported neutral service should be considered
manipulation of the user and a violation of the duty of loyalty.232
Companies should not be able to surreptitiously subject their users to
campaigns of ideological manipulation, and individuals should be able to
hold them legally responsible if they do.
Distinguishing manipulation that exploits vulnerabilities and is based
on subverting the user’s interests to the company’s divergent ones still
allows companies to conduct legitimate forms of persuasion—generally
speaking, non-exploitative advertising, or product architecture that does
not seek to exploit users’ vulnerabilities for the company’s benefit. An
advertiser, or the operator of the site hosting the ad, should not be able to
target a user with ads for casinos based on her searches for the nearest
Gamblers Anonymous meeting. This surreptitiously exploits a
vulnerability of the user to the advertiser’s benefit and the user’s
detriment. But a company could, for example, target a user on a contextual
basis by sending her an ad for Gatorade, a sports drink, because she is
reading an article on how to avoid dehydration in sports, or streaming a
sporting event. This attempt to persuade the user for the company’s gain—
either the publisher or the advertiser—did not exploit the user’s
231. Dobkin, supra note 29, at 21–22.
232. See also Zittrain, supra note 15, at 340 (“However agreed, a central responsibility of an
information intermediary would be to serve up others’ data in ways not designed to further the political
goals of the intermediary.”).
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vulnerability or surreptitiously perform one function while insidiously
accomplishing another to the company’s benefit and her detriment.233
As discussed above, a data collector can attempt to manipulate users
directly, or it can enable or facilitate manipulation by third parties, and an
effective fiduciary framework would address both. Information fiduciaries
enabling manipulation by third parties, such as through search results that
prioritize misinformation, could violate the duty of loyalty or care. For
example, reporting by April Glaser echoed a version of Dobkin’s
hypothetical when she demonstrated that YouTube consistently surfaces
search results for “abortion” that reflect anti-abortion disinformation.234
Unlike Dobkin’s hypothetical, the ideological skew of the abortion results
on YouTube is due to the content uploaded by users of that platform, the
architecture of how its algorithm rewards engaging content,235 and lack of
enforcement,236 rather than the result of an ideological agenda being
pushed by YouTube itself. But as noted above, this kind of negligence can
still have dangerous effects if users take the disinformation at face value,237
and in certain cases, it may be appropriate to hold platforms responsible
for patterns of reckless disregard for how third parties are manipulating
the platform. Disinformation about vaccinations fits a similar profile of
potential harm created by a platform that fails to crack down on
misinformation and users who do not realize the information they are
being provided is false.238
Another example of an ideologically manipulative practice would be
attempting to surreptitiously influence users regarding whom they should
233. See BALKIN, supra note 26, at 12–13.
234. April Glaser, YouTube’s Search Results for “Abortion” Show Exactly What Anti-Abortion
Activists Want Women to See, SLATE (Dec. 21, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/
12/youtube-search-abortion-results-pro-life.html [https://perma.cc/D52U-WERF].
235. Tufekci, supra note 207; see also Jack Nicas, How YouTube Drives People to the Internet’s
Darkest Corners, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 7, 2018, 1:04 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-youtubedrives-viewers-to-the-internets-darkest-corners-1518020478 [https://perma.cc/E3WJ-2FL7].
236. Andy Kroll, John Podesta Is Ready to Talk About Pizzagate, ROLLING STONE (Dec. 9,
2018), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/john-podesta-pizzagate-766489/ [http
s://perma.cc/F4EB-VM8N]; see also Glaser, supra note 234.
237. See Ben Collins, Posing as Gay Men on Twitter, a Troll Goes Viral with Attempts to Falsely
Tie the LGBTQ Community to Pedophilia, NBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/
tech/tech-news/posing-gay-men-twitter-troll-goes-viral-attempts-falsely-tie-n954721?cid=sm_npd_
nn_tw_ma [https://perma.cc/RE9M-8PJS] (describing how trolls on Twitter stole the identities of gay
travel bloggers in an attempt to create and spread false evidence of a connection between
homosexuality and pedophilia; only to have their disinformation picked up and reported by far-right
news sites and public figures).
238. Jessica Glenza, Russian Trolls ‘Spreading Discord’ Over Vaccine Safety Online,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/aug/23/russian-trolls-spreadvaccine-misinformation-on-twitter [https://perma.cc/WDM5-83B2] (“The vast majority of Americans
believe vaccines are safe and effective, but looking at Twitter gives the impression that there is a lot
of debate.”).
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vote for,239 or allowing third parties to do that.240 The first would be a
violation of the duty of loyalty whereas the second could violate loyalty or
care, depending on whether the third-party manipulation resulted from a
partnership with the fiduciary or was simply facilitated by its negligent
design and oversight.
Other types of manipulation attempt to surreptitiously sway users’
actions to the benefit of the collector and the detriment of the subject for
solely commercial gain. Some products or services employ “dark
patterns”—the architecture of a digital product or platform designed to
induce certain behavior—in order to coax more information from the user
than she would otherwise share,241 to persuade the user to use the service
for longer or engage with more users while using the service, to spend
more money, or to only spend money on certain products.242 In a
particularly bleak example, Facebook reportedly told advertisers it could
identify teens who felt “worthless” and “useless,” presumably so that they
could be targeted for advertisements based on that vulnerability.243 Balkin
argues that attempts by tech companies to make their products and services
“addictive” should also violate the duty of loyalty as a form of
manipulation.244
Discrimination—whether directly perpetrated by the product or
service or merely facilitated by it—could also violate the duty of care,
loyalty, or both. Unlike with manipulation, a definition that requires the
fiduciary to benefit from the detriment in order for a violation to exist
would likely be unacceptably narrow. In context, an anti-discrimination
principle is not foreign to fiduciary codes; the ethical rules for both

239. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever Finding Out,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/information-fiduciarysolution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering [https://perma.cc/Y3JJ-WY3T]; see also Dobkin, supra
note 29, at 25.
240. DiResta et al., supra note 123.
241. See generally FORBUKERRADET, DECEIVED BY DESIGN (2018), https://fil.forbrukerradet.
no/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/2018-06-27-deceived-by-design-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WK94WG99]; Waldman, supra note 201, at 177 (“But Facebook also uses design tactics that leverage the
trust we have in our friends to manipulate us into sharing personal information with websites,
advertisers, and third party partners we’ve never met or heard of. When it does, Facebook crosses the
line from carmaker into carjacker, from a conduit of social sharing to a manipulative for-profit scheme
where users are reduced to the terabytes of data they generate.”).
242. FORBUKERRADET, supra note 241, at 6; see also Laura Stevens, Sharon Terlep & Annie
Gasparro, Amazon Targets Unprofitable Items, with a Sharper Focus on the Bottom Line, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 16, 2018, 7:55 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-targets-unprofitable-items-with-asharper-focus-on-the-bottom-line-11544965201 [https://perma.cc/YSQ5-LSZV].
243. Sam Levin, Facebook Told Advertisers It Can Identify Teens Feeling ‘Insecure’ and
‘Worthless’, GUARDIAN (May 1, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/may/01/faceb
ook-advertising-data-insecure-teens [https://perma.cc/ZG5S-P49K].
244. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 14.
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lawyers245 and doctors246 incorporate responsibilities to avoid
discrimination in order to ensure equitable access to their services. Dobkin
proposes that fiduciaries would be required to adhere to an antidiscrimination principle, and taxonomizes three primary modes of digital
discrimination: access to services, different prices, and refusing to offer a
service in a certain area, with geography serving as a proxy for race
(“digital redlining”).247
In some cases, it may be relatively easy to demonstrate that a
fiduciary is engaging in discrimination, as it continues to profit from a
service that the company is aware is having discriminatory effects.248 The
kind of “engaging” content that tech companies are incentivized to
promote can often include racist or sexist content or harassment based on
protected attributes, such as gender or race.249 Thus, a company’s failure
to put the safety of its users over revenue or lax enforcement has
disproportionate effects for the targets of harassment or the users whom
an under-enforced policy was designed to protect.250 And just as a
prohibition on manipulation as described above would not prohibit all
targeted advertising, the application of the duty of loyalty or care to
exclude discrimination would not prevent every way in which a service
provider treats one group differently from another based on immutable
characteristics, or adherence to a certain group. For example, a dating app
would not be enabling discrimination by permitting users to only receive
“matches” or messages from members of the genders they prefer, as
opposed to mandating that all users receive matches from all genders. But
a dating app that allowed users to search for matches based on ethnicity
would likely be enabling discrimination.251 As demonstrated by the
245. See, e.g., Myles V. Lynk, Professor of Law, Ariz. State Univ., Presentation to the Labor &
Employment Law College: Discrimination & Harassment in the Profession: A New Ethics Rule (Nov.
10, 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2018/AnnualConference/
papers /Ethics%20Rule%20on%20Discrimination.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A9S-ZC2X].
246. See, e.g., Danielle Hahn Chaet, AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions Related to
Discrimination and Disparities in Health Care, 18 AMA J. ETHICS 1095 (2016).
247. Dobkin, supra note 29, at 27.
248. See, e.g., Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO L.J. 1271 (2017) (arguing that public
accommodations laws should extend to discrimination from users, and to the extent that they do not,
suggest modifications).
249. SYLVAIN, supra note 126, at 3–4 (“Intermediaries, moreover, design their platforms in ways
that shape the form and substance of their users’ content . . . [and] should not get a free pass for
enabling unlawful discriminatory conduct.”).
250. Id. at 9 (“[T]he victims of online abuse tend to be the same sorts of people who have always
been subject to attack and harassment offline in the United States and elsewhere—in particular, young
women, racial minorities, and sexual ‘deviants.’”).
251. See generally Jevan Hutson et al., Debiasing Desire: Addressing Bias & Discrimination on
Intimate Platforms, 2 PROC. ACM HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION 73 (2018) (describing dating
platforms that have been criticized for facilitating discrimination).
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volume of bad faith arguments raised in recent years about a non-existent
specter of bias against conservative political views on online platforms,252
any definition of discrimination should take care in establishing a standard
of proof and defining the relevant standard of care.
It is likely that manipulation and discrimination will often be found
together, though again, the one should not require the other. While
targeting certain users might exacerbate the degree of the violation of the
duty of loyalty, it should not be necessary for manipulation to take place.
For example, Facebook’s subjecting black users to be disproportionately
targeted by Russian disinformation agents in order to persuade them not
to vote for Hillary Clinton,253 on top of the company’s ignoring the needs
of black users254 and being insufficiently cooperative with Senate
investigations into interference with their platforms,255 would likely
violate the duties of care and loyalty. Given that the people being targeted
were selected on the basis of race, this could constitute both discrimination
and manipulation, particularly given that the purpose of the manipulation
was to deter people from voting, a protected activity. In contrast, Facebook
making it appear as though users had notifications they couldn’t access
until they accepted its new terms and conditions is no less manipulative
for targeting all users instead of a subset of them256 because it
surreptitiously exploited its users to their detriment, and to its benefit.
252. Brian Feldman, Twitter Is Not ‘Shadow Banning’ Republicans, N.Y. MAG. (July 25, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/amp/2018/07/twitter-is-not-shadow-banning-republicans.html [https:/
/perma.cc/688X-3TH3]; Colby Itkowitz, Congersswoman to Google CEO: Why When I Search ‘Idiot’
Do I Get Pictures of Trump?, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
2018/12/11/congresswoman-google-ceo-why-when-i-search-idiot-do-i-get-pictures-trump/?utm_ter
m=.cb7b5a9424da [https://perma.cc/AYD7-22RG] (describing how in subsequent House hearing,
“Republicans on the panel couldn’t get past the myth that some person(s) inside Google couldn’t
arbitrarily change search algorithms for political gain.”); Alyssa Newcomb & Ben Collins, House
Republicans Float Online Conspiracy Theories in Hearing About Social Media ‘Censorship’, NBC
NEWS (July 17, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/house-republicans-float-onlineconspiracy-theories-hearing-about-social-media-n892206 [https://perma.cc/2UNJ-ADHW] (detailing
the House Judiciary Committee Hearing on purported bias on tech platforms, and the lack of evidence
to support the claims by congressional Republicans of bias or ideological censorship); Laura Hazard
Owen, Twitter’s Not “Shadow Banning” Republicans, but Get Ready to Hear That It Is, NIEMANLAB
(July 27, 2018), http://www.niemanlab.org/2018/07/twitters-not-shadow-banning-republicans-but-get
-ready-to-hear-that-it-is/ [https://perma.cc/JZZ7-TU2P]; Nicholas Thompson & Fred Vogelstein,
Inside the Two Years That Shook Facebook—And the World, WIRED (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.
wired.com/story/inside-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-2-years-of-hell/ [https://perma.cc/NEU5-4W7C]
(describing allegations of bias against conservatives at Facebook and the lack of basis for them).
253. DiResta et al., supra note 123, at 8.
254. See Mark S. Luckie, Facebook is Failing Its Black Employees and Its Black Users,
FACEBOOK (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.facebook.com/notes/mark-s-luckie/facebook-is-failingits-black-employees-and-its-black-users/1931075116975013/ [https://perma.cc/8WYG-PZ5J]; Riley,
supra note 175.
255. DiResta et al., supra note 123, at 5, 33.
256. FORBUKERRADET, supra note 241, at 28.
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Some conduct might violate multiple duties at once. For example,
various combinations of lax enforcement, direct manipulation, or enabled
manipulation might violate both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.
Consider Google’s Play Store, which forbids developers who participate
in its “Designed for Families” program to use “overly commercially
aggressive tactics” on child users.257 Yet in a white paper by Googleowned AdMob, the digital advertising company advises developers on
how to wring the most revenue out of its users, including “motivating”
users who are “stuck” on a level.258 In a letter and subsequent complaint
to the FTC, child advocates discussed how developers have used those
very techniques in apps targeted to children in order to maximize revenue,
such as making a puppy cry unless the user purchases accessories for her
or having a well-loved children’s character express her disappointment
that the child did not purchase an in-app skill.259 This kind of tactic
manipulates children, whose judgment and understanding of commercial
tactics are less developed than those of adults.260 One developer quoted in
the AdMob whitepaper, TabTale, was found to employ those types of
techniques in its child-directed apps.261 Google’s failures to enforce its
Play Store policies would violate the duty of care, while its proactive
encouragement, via its subsidiary AdMob, that developers try to
manipulate its users into spending more money in Play Store apps would
seem to violate the duty of loyalty. That Google was encouraging a
developer that primarily makes children’s apps, and offers its children’s
apps on the Play Store, to implement this manipulative technique also
seems discriminatory towards children.

257. Complaint at 37–38, Request to Investigate Google’s Unfair and Deceptive Practices in
Marketing Apps for Children, Submitted to the F.T.C. by the Institute for Public Representation at
Georgetown Law on behalf of Campaign for a Commercial-Free Childhood, Center for Digital
Democracy, and Others (Dec. 19, 2018) (describing “overly aggressive commercial tactics”); see also
id. at 14–16 (describing how AdMob incentivizes and facilitates such tactics).
258. Sean Meng, Charge Your Game Monetization with a Winning Combination of In-App
Purchases and Ads, GOOGLE ADMOB (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.blog.google/products/admob/
charge-your-game-monetization-with-admob/ [https://perma.cc/LE82-SZQH].
259. See Complaint, supra note 257, at 37–42; Press Release, Campaign for a Commercial-Free
Childhood, Advocates Ask FTC to Investigate Apps Which Manipulate Kids (Oct. 29, 2018), www.
commercialfreechildhood.org/advocates-ask-ftc-investigate-apps-which-manipulate-kids
[https://
perma.cc/PL7C-CGJR].
260. Marisa Meyer et al., Advertising in Young Children’s Apps: A Content Study, 40 J. DEV.
BEHAV. PEDIATR. 32, 32 (2018) (citing J. Howard Beales, Advertising to Kids and the FTC: A
Regulatory Retrospective That Advises the Present, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2004), https://www.
ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/advertising-kids-and-ftc-regulatoryretrospective-advises-present/040802adstokids.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2TU-Y6M7].
261. Complaint, supra note 257, at 37–42.
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V. FURTHER CONSIDERATIONS
While the idea of applying fiduciary duties to data collectors has
grown in popularity,262 it has also been subject to critique, notably by Khan
and Pozen in their essay A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries.263
While I share their skepticism towards the efficacy of an opt-in fiduciary
regime, I do respectfully disagree with them on other points. Broadly, the
authors argue that a fiduciary approach precludes badly needed structural
reforms, and that it would reify the dominance of platform companies
rather than eroding it, while strengthening an illusion of those companies’
trustworthiness that should instead be shattered.264 I believe a mandatory
framework that creates significant obligations and prohibitions for data
collectors would deter the kind of digital exploitation that the current
ecosystem incentivizes, particularly when bolstered by an impactful
enforcement regime and avenues for individuals to both exercise their
rights and sue on the basis of their violation. It likely would not accomplish
sweeping competition-focused reforms, but it does not purport to. Nor
does it preclude additional statutory or regulatory competition-focused
reforms, which I agree are needed.265
The critique that a trust-focused approach might inure the perception
of data collectors from the skepticism they deserve266 is also well-taken,
though it again assumes the more conciliatory model of an opt-in regime
that I agree is insufficient. The entire basis of fiduciary law is the
assumption that fiduciaries are incentivized to take advantage of their
clients unless the law somehow changes that calculus, such as by
prohibiting self-dealing.267 The language of trust is not an empty
assurance, or a congratulatory description that assumes that information
fiduciaries have earned the trust they have been given: rather, it invokes
the gravity of the obligation that U.S. privacy law has not previously
required them to meet. The compulsory nature of the fiduciary status and
robust enforcement of violations assumes inevitable abuse of that trust,

262. Khan & Pozen, supra note 179, at 3–4.
263. Id. at 29–30.
264. Or as Khan and Pozen eloquently put it, “a framework, we fear, invites an enervating
complacency toward online platforms’ structural power and a premature abandonment of more robust
visions of public regulation.” Id. at 1.
265. Balkin argues for how such reforms would be complementary to the objectives of a
fiduciary framework. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 10–11; id. at 15 (“The fiduciary approach also meshes
well with other forms of consumer protection, and it does not exclude other reforms, like GDPR-style
privacy regulation. In particular, it does not get in the way of new pro-competition rules or increased
antitrust enforcement as described above.”).
266. Khan & Pozen, supra note 179, at 27.
267. Frankel, supra note 12, at 825 (describing the motivation behind court-fashioned fiduciary
duties as an “acknowledge[ment of] the frailty of human nature”).
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rather than presuming that data collectors deserve it and should not be
scrutinized.268
Khan and Pozen also argue that a business model based on behavioral
advertising is fundamentally incompatible with a duty to put the wellbeing of users first, which takes a narrow view of the types of business
models that a fiduciary framework would hope to modify. While many of
the abuses that a new law would hopefully fix stem from business models
that are inherently harmful, others are the unintended consequence of the
skewed priorities in an ecosystem with few applicable laws and limited
enforcement. The issue is not always an intrinsically venal business model,
but also ones where it is too easy for companies to leave questions of
whether their product enables discrimination, manipulates users, or is
likely to instigate third party misuse at the end of the product design cycle,
rather than at the beginning.269 That critique also overlooks the
transformative effect that shifting to the presumption that data collectors
are responsible to their users, from the presumption that they generally are
not, would have for the holes, lapses, and inefficacies of existing privacy
law. And as noted supra,270 traditional fiduciary relationships also suffer
from similarly recurring conflicts—the acknowledgement of inherent
conflicts, and a desire to deter fiduciaries from taking advantage of them,
is the fundamental premise of a fiduciary framework.
The objective of this Article is not to suggest that fiduciary duties are
necessarily a better approach than a system based on a constitutional right
to privacy and data protection against private entities in a magical land
where the U.S. Constitution contained such a specific right, or if scholars
were to devise a sufficiently convincing theory that it does.271 Nor is it to
suggest that an information fiduciary approach and the regulatory vision
of the GDPR are mutually incompatible.272 They share many objectives,
like protecting the dignity, autonomy, and privacy of individuals in the
digital age, and certain approaches, such as significantly disincentivizing

268. Frankel, supra note 12, at 804 (“[A]ll [fiduciary relationships] require the fiduciary to use
delegated power to facilitate his service to the other. All pose the possibility of abuse of that power.”).
269. This of course echoes the objectives of GDPR’s Article 25 requirement of privacy by
design. (“[T]he controller shall, both at the time of the determination of the means for processing and
at the time of the processing itself, implement appropriate technical and organisational
measures . . . which are designed to implement data-protection principles . . . in an effective manner
and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of this
Regulation and protect the rights of data subjects.”). GDPR, supra note 70, art. 25(1), at 48.
270. See supra Section IV.A.
271. They haven’t yet. See McGeveran, supra note 7, at 976; Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 3,
at 133–34.
272. As Balkin notes, an information fiduciary framework is not mutually incompatible with the
GDPR, nor with pro-competition consumer protection intervention. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 15.
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misconduct273 through enhanced enforcement mechanisms. Both
approaches attempt to protect individuals against broader classes of harms
beyond privacy, such as algorithmic bias.274 Many U.S. companies do
business in Europe and are required to comply with the GDPR; many EU
citizens and U.S. customers of EU business have rights under the
GDPR.275 Moreover, the focus of a fiduciary framework on the data
collectors—what standards they should be required to meet, and what they
should be prohibited from doing—could, and should, include certain
affirmative individual rights like the ones the GDPR creates. The duty of
loyalty or care, for example, could be written to incorporate any number
of the GDPR’s individual rights, such as access, correction, and data
portability.276 Many of the GDPR’s objectives and legal innovations are
laudable, and should be emulated, as U.S. state lawmakers have already
begun to do.277
But in the U.S. legal system—lacking a constitutional right to
privacy against all entities, limited by the First Amendment, and with a
strong, historical and philosophical bent towards deregulation—a brickby-brick recreation of the GDPR is likely unrealistic. An information
fiduciary framework can overcome those very roadblocks, while
achieving the GDPR’s primary objective of restoring individual
protections against digital harms.278 And while Congress certainly does not
need to locate a right to privacy against private entities in the Constitution
to create one by statute, a fiduciary model injects a moral imperative to
273. See generally Electronic Frontier Foundation, Comment Letter on the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration’s Approach to Consumer Privacy (Nov. 9,
2018), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/11.9.18_comments_of_eff_to_ntia_dkt_1808
21780-8780-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QHD-PGG6] (suggesting that the NTIA adopt both specific
provisions to the GDPR, such as data portability, and an information fiduciary approach).
274. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 22, at 46; see also Rights Related to Automated Decision Making
Including Profiling, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-dataprotection/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/individual-rights/rights-related-toautomated-decision-making-including-profiling/ [https://perma.cc/N46R-ZY65].
275. GDPR, supra note 70, art. 3, at 32–33.
276. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 88–91.
277. See generally DATAGUIDANCE, COMPARING PRIVACY LAWS: GDPR V. CCPA (2018),
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/
NR5K-XYCX] (discussing the similarities and contrasts of the California Consumer Privacy Act and
the GDPR); Katherine E. Armstrong & Qisui Y. Newcom, New Washington State Privacy Bill
Incorporates Some GDPR Concepts, NAT’L L. REV. (Jan. 31, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/
article/new-washington-state-privacy-bill-incorporates-some-gdpr-concepts [https://perma.cc/HSH8TJMS] (describing a new Washington state bill that includes GDPR-inspired rights); Daniel Kim &
Alaap B. Shah, Follow the Leader: California Paves the Way for Other States to Strengthen Privacy
Protections, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c5adfa5e2ae9-4903-82f1-0e06f0bc1e49 [https://perma.cc/9N5E-CB4Y] (discussing privacy bills in eight states
looking to both the GDPR and CCPA as inspiration).
278. See supra Part I.
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digital protections that the U.S. conception of privacy as a good frequently
lacks.
Moreover, the balance that fiduciary duties can strike between the
legitimate commercial objectives of the provider and protecting the rights
of the subject also coalesces with a U.S. privacy framework accustomed
to allowing companies to move fast and break things, while preventing
companies from breaking them quite so rampantly. It can meet a range of
competing objectives without sacrificing the primary goal of strengthening
protections for individuals against a range of evolving digital harms.
Finally, an information fiduciary framework can coalesce with U.S. laws
more easily than a wholesale import of the GDPR, as it can accommodate
First Amendment rights that a GDPR clone would violate.279 Indeed,
Balkin’s focus in proposing the value of a fiduciary framework was free
expression, and how fiduciary duties could accommodate the First
Amendment prerogatives of data collectors with privacy rights, not just
their commercial objectives.280
While an information fiduciary framework would inherently
alleviate certain aspects of what ails the U.S. privacy ecosystem, other
corrective elements are required for the framework to have its intended
effect. First, for any new privacy law to significantly change the skewed
balance of power between individuals and data collectors, it must modify
the existing incentives for data collectors to ignore the law. In an
environment of narrowly defined privacy laws, few private rights of
action, a slim likelihood of regulatory enforcement, and tempered
consequences in the unlikely event enforcement occurs, companies
justifiably assume that the risk of violating the law is lower than the risk
of failing to maximize growth and profits. Creating new rights for
individuals by characterizing data collectors as information fiduciaries
will do nothing without making it expensive or legally risky for companies
to violate those rights.
As such, assuming a proposal that still relies on the FTC as the
primary privacy enforcement agency, the FTC must be given rulemaking
authority and civil penalty authority, as well as more resources and
manpower. The likelihood that a regulator will investigate lapses and
breaches and that investigation will result in a meaningful fine or
injunction must significantly rise for companies to put more resources and
thought not only into compliance, but into prevention of misuse. A private
279. Most notably with Article 17’s right to erasure, or “the right to be forgotten.” GDPR, supra
note 70, art. 17, at 43–44.
280. Balkin, Free Speech, supra note 10, at 1154. (describing the concepts of algorithmic
nuisance and information fiduciaries as a way to “understand when the First Amendment should allow
the state to regulate companies that engage in the collection, analysis, and distribution of data.”).
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right of action would also push tech companies to invest more heavily in
the welfare of its users. Hoofnagle et al. describe the GDPR’s objective as
putting privacy law on par with the types of law that companies “take
seriously”—namely, antitrust and foreign corrupt practices.281 An
information fiduciary framework should do the same.
Finally, expanding the type of harms a fiduciary should be held liable
for also necessarily touches on questions of Communications Decency
Act § 230.282 Under that statute’s broad liability shield, platform operators
are not considered the “publisher or speaker of any information provided”
by a third party on their platform and do not bear liability for good faith
efforts to restrict certain kinds of harmful content, such as obscenity or
harassment.283 Courts have interpreted § 230 quite broadly, and scholars284
and advocates285 have argued that cabining the statute in any way will be
the beginning of the end of online free expression and a vibrant internet
ecosystem. Defining the harms that platforms should perhaps bear legal
responsibility for—even after acknowledging that the harms are
egregious—is certainly a delicate exercise,286 and one that has already
gone awry once.287 But the robust evolution of the online platforms has
demonstrated, as Danielle Citron and Ben Wittes memorably put it, that
“the internet will not break,” if certain modifications are made to the law
281. Hoofnagle et al., supra note 102, at 67.
282. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018).
283. Id. § 230(c).
284. Daphne Keller, Toward Clearer Conversation About Platform Liability, KNIGHT
FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/toward-clearer-conversation-about-platfor
m-liability [https://perma.cc/NX48-ZPPA] (discussing the benefits of § 230 for the development of
the internet and urging restraint against “shoot-from-the-hip legislative changes”); Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Silicon Valley’s Regulatory Exceptionalism Comes to an End, LAWFARE (Mar. 23,
2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/silicon-valleys-regulatory-exceptionalism-comes-end [https://
perma.cc/7ZZ4-MC28] (calling § 230 the “Magna Carta of the internet”).
285. Section 230 of the Communicates Decency Act, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 [https://perma.cc/5CH5-6NXL] (“CDA 230 is perhaps the most
influential law to protect the kind of innovation that has allowed the Internet to thrive since 1996.”).
286. James Grimmelman, To Err Is to Platform, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://
knightcolumbia.org/content/err-platform [https://perma.cc/U5VR-3LEC] (“How crisply is it possible
to define these categories [of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ content on platforms for the purpose of § 230
liability]? . . . Even a ‘passive’ intermediary has still ‘acted’ by providing a platform that is a but-for
cause of the harm.”).
287. Section 230 was recently amended by the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act (FOSTA), a move that has been widely criticized by scholars and advocates for the
perverse incentives it creates for platforms, and the extent to which it endangers sex workers while
purporting to prevent sex trafficking. Danielle Citron & Quinta Jurecic, FOSTA: The New Anti-SexTrafficking Legislation May Not End the Internet, but It’s Not Good Law Either, LAWFARE (Mar. 28,
2018, 2:41 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/fosta-new-anti-sex-trafficking-legislation-may-notend-internet-its-not-good-law-either [https://perma.cc/4ZKF-X9CZ]; Aja Romano, A New Law
Intended to Curb Sex Trafficking Threatens the Future of the Internet as We Know It, VOX (July 2,
2018, 1:08 PM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2018/4/13/17172762/fosta-sesta-backpage-230-intern
et-freedom [https://perma.cc/P6FE-735F].
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in light of the harm they have simultaneously enabled.288 They argue for
hinging § 230’s liability shield for platforms on their exercise of
reasonable care,289 which would “reduce opportunities for abuses without
interfering with the further development of a vibrant internet or
unintentionally turning innocent platforms into involuntary insurers for
those injured through their sites.”290 One can imagine a similar reworking
of § 230 to include an exception to the liability shield when service
providers violate the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, or confidentiality.291
Olivier Sylvain, for example, argues that courts should account for how
design choices enable or cause harm to “predictable targets of harassment
and discrimination” when considering whether to extend § 230’s liability
shield to platform intermediaries.292 While a full treatment of the issue is
beyond the scope of this Article, there is clearly room for certain
limitations to § 230’s extraordinarily broad liability shield without
“breaking the internet.”293
CONCLUSION
The various interpretations of how fiduciary duties could be applied
to data collectors discussed in this Article are united by a common theme:
they restore a rights-type valence to a set of relationships that have been
reduced to a commercial lens in U.S. privacy policy. Changing the default
assumption that individuals are owed nothing by data collectors does not
create a constitutional right like the ones undergirding the GDPR, but it
does remove some of the obstacles standing between ostensible
protections for digital autonomy and a meaningful ability for individuals
and regulators to vindicate violations. Without contradicting the value and
288. Danielle Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans
§ 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 401, 401 (2017).
289. Id. at 419.
290. Id. at 423; see also Danielle Citron, Section 230’s Challenge to Civil Rights and Civil
Liberties, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., https://knightcolumbia.org/content/section-230s-challengecivil-rights-and-civil-liberties#/_ftnref39 [https://perma.cc/LC7Y-GVBZ]; Ari Ezra Waldman, Safe
Social Spaces, WASH. U. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 49) (on file with Washington
University Law Review) (praising the Citron/Wittes proposal and arguing that it would “buttress
content moderation designed for user safety and trust”).
291. While a full analysis of the intersection is beyond the scope of this Article, it is notable that
even Senator Ron Wyden, one of the authors of § 230 and one of its strongest proponents, has
suggested that given the strength of the internet ecosystem that developed since the passage of the law
and the problems of harassment that companies have failed to account for, it may be time to revisit
how limited the platforms’ responsibilities are to their users. See Colin Lecher, Sen. Ron Wyden on
Breaking up Facebook, Net Neutrality, and the Law That Built the Internet, THE VERGE (Jul. 24, 2018),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/7/24/17606974/oregon-senator-ron-wyden-interview-internet-sectio
n-230-net-neutrality [https://perma.cc/9AQW-P49T].
292. SYLVAIN, supra note 126, at 3.
293. See Danielle Citron, Sexual Privacy, YALE L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 66) (on file
with Yale Law Journal) (“The call for a more regulated internet is no longer considered outlandish.”).
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potential of legal arguments for a constitutional right to privacy against
private entities under U.S. law, nor arguing that one is needed in order to
protect privacy rights by statute, an information fiduciary framework does
not require such a right to protect individuals from privacy violations,
manipulation, discrimination, and other violations of trust. As fiduciary
scholar Tamar Frankel memorably put it, fiduciary duties restore
“morality” to legal relationships that lack it.294
In some ways, this proposal may sound radical—but so too is the
extent to which the scales are tipped. U.S. privacy law needs a radical
course correction, not a mere adjustment. A formal classification of data
collectors as information fiduciaries simply recognizes the power
imbalance that policymakers, academics, and industry can all see exists,
and ascribes corresponding obligations to the individuals that the law
otherwise permits those entities to exploit.

294. Frankel, supra note 12, at 831. (“[T]he emphasis of fiduciary law on morality resulted in
elevating the purpose for which the fiduciary’s power is granted to a position of priority over other
values which may guide the fiduciary. For example, the corporate director’s primary duty is to profit
for the shareholders; the duty of the attorney is to represent his client’s interests; and the duty of the
physician is to heal and prolong life. These duties assume a greater moral stature than other, conflicting
moral values.”).

